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DURING  THE  1980s, a number  of unusual  financial  crises occurred. In 
Chile, for example, the financial  sector collapsed, leaving the govern- 
ment with responsibility  for extensive foreign debts. In the United 
States, large  numbers  of government-insured  savings  and  loans became 
insolvent-and  the government  picked  up the tab. In Dallas, Texas, real 
estate prices and construction  continued  to boom even after vacancies 
had skyrocketed, and then suffered a dramatic  collapse. Also in the 
United States, the  junk bond market,  which fueled the takeover  wave, 
had  a similar  boom and  bust. 
In this paper,  we use simple  theory  and  direct  evidence to highlight  a 
common  thread  that runs through  these four episodes. The theory sug- 
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gests that this common  thread  may be relevant  to other cases in which 
countries  took on excessive foreign debt, governments  had to bail out 
insolvent  financial  institutions,  real  estate prices increased  dramatically 
and  then  fell, or new financial  markets  experienced  a boom  and  bust. We 
describe  the evidence, however, only for the cases of financial  crisis in 
Chile, the thrift  crisis in the United States, Dallas  real  estate and  thrifts, 
and  junk bonds. 
Our theoretical  analysis shows that an economic underground  can 
come to life if firms  have an incentive to go broke  for profit  at society's 
expense (to loot) instead  of to go for  broke  (to gamble  on success). Bank- 
ruptcy  for  profit  will occur  if poor  accounting,  lax regulation,  or low pen- 
alties for abuse give owners an incentive to pay themselves more than 
their  firms  are worth  and  then default  on their  debt obligations. 
Bankruptcy  for profit occurs most commonly when a government 
guarantees  a firm's  debt obligations.  The most obvious such guarantee 
is deposit insurance,  but governments  also implicitly  or explicitly  guar- 
antee  the policies  of insurance  companies,  the pension  obligations  of pri- 
vate firms, virtually  all the obligations  of large banks, student loans, 
mortgage  finance  of subsidized  housing, and the general  obligations  of 
large  or influential  firms.  These arrangements  can create a web of com- 
panies that operate  under  soft budget  constraints.  To enforce discipline 
and  to limit  opportunism  by shareholders,  governments  make  continued 
access to the guarantees  contingent  on meeting specific targets for an 
accounting  measure  of net worth. However, because net worth  is typi- 
cally a small  fraction  of total  assets for  the insured  institutions  (this, after 
all, is why they demand  and  receive the government  guarantees),  bank- 
ruptcy for profit  can easily become a more attractive strategy  for the 
owners than  maximizing  true  economic values. 
If so, the normal economics of maximizing  economic value is re- 
placed  by the topsy-turvy  economics of maximizing  current  extractable 
value, which tends to drive  the firm's  economic net worth  deeply nega- 
tive. Once owners have decided  that they can extract more  from a firm 
by maximizing  their  present  take, any action  that  allows them  to extract 
more currently  will be attractive-even  if it causes a large  reduction  in 
the true  economic net worth  of the firm.  A dollar  in increased  dividends 
today is worth  a dollar  to owners, but a dollar  in increased  future  earn- 
ings of the firm  is worth  nothing  because future  payments  accrue  to the 
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profit  can cause social losses that  dwarf  the transfers  from  creditors  that 
the shareholders  can induce. Because of this disparity  between  what  the 
owners can capture  and the losses that they create, we refer to bank- 
ruptcy  for profit  as looting. 
Unfortunately,  firms  covered by government  guarantees  are not the 
only ones that face severely distorted  incentives. Looting can spread 
symbiotically  to other  markets,  bringing  to life a whole economic  under- 
world  with perverse  incentives. The looters in the sector  covered by the 
government  guarantees  will make  trades  with unaffiliated  firms  outside 
this sector, causing them to produce  in a way that helps maximize  the 
looters' current  extractions  with  no regard  for  future  losses. Rather  than 
looking  for business  partners  who will honor  their  contracts,  the looters 
look for  partners  who will sign  contracts  that  appear  to have high  current 
value if fulfilled  but that  will not-and  could not-be  honored. 
We start  with an abstract  model that identifies  the conditions  under 
which looting takes place. In subsequent  sections, we describe  the cir- 
cumstances  surrounding  the financial  crisis in Chile and  the thrift  crisis 
in the United States, paying special attention  to the regulatory  and ac- 
counting  details that are at the heart of our story. We then turn to an 
analysis  of the real  estate boom  in Dallas, the center  of activity  for Texas 
thrifts. We construct a rational  expectations model of the market  for 
land in which investors infer economic fundamentals  from market 
prices.' We then show how the introduction  of even a relatively small 
number  of looters can have a large  effect on market  prices. 
In the last section, we examine  the possible role of looting  at savings 
and loans and insurance  companies in manipulating  the prices in the 
newly emerging  junk bond market  during  the 1980s. In contrast  to the 
Dallas  land  market,  where  the movements  in prices  appear  to have been 
an unintended  side effect of individual  looting strategies,  we argue  that 
in the  junk  bond  market,  outsiders  could have-and  may have-coordi- 
nated  the actions of some looters in a deliberate  attempt  to manipulate 
prices. Evidence suggests  that this opportunity  was understood  and  ex- 
ploited  by market  participants.  By keeping  interest  rates on  junk bonds 
artificially  low, this strategy  could have significantly  increased  the frac- 
tion of firms  that  could profitably  be taken  over through  a debt-financed 
acquisition. 
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Before turning  to the theoretical model, we will place this paper 
within  the context of the large  literature  that bears on the issues we ad- 
dress. The literature  on the thrift  crisis has two main strands:  popular 
accounts2  and  economists' accounts.3 
In contrast  to popular  accounts, economists' work is typically  weak 
on details  because the incentives economists  emphasize  cannot  explain 
much of the behavior  that took place. The typical economic analysis is 
based on moral  hazard,  excessive risk-taking,  and the absence of risk 
sensitivity  in the premiums  charged  for deposit  insurance.  This strategy 
has many  colorful  descriptions:  "heads  I win, tails I break  even";  "gam- 
bling  on resurrection";  and  "fourth-quarter  football";  to namejust  a few. 
Using an analogy with options pricing, economists developed a nice 
theoretical  analysis  of such excessive risk-taking  strategies.4  The prob- 
lem with this explanation  for events of the 1980s  is that someone who is 
gambling  that  his thrift  might  actually  make  a profit  would  never  operate 
the way many thrifts  did, with total disregard  for even the most basic 
principles of  lending: maintaining  reasonable documentation about 
loans, protecting  against  external  fraud  and  abuse, verifying  information 
on loan applications,  even bothering  to have borrowers  fill out loan ap- 
plications.5  Examinations  of the operation  of many such thrifts show 
that  the owners acted as if future  losses were somebody  else's problem. 
They were right. 
Some economists' accounts  acknowledge  that  something  besides ex- 
cessive risk-taking  might  have been taking  place during  the 1980s.6  Ed- 
ward Kane's comparison  of the behavior  at savings and loans (S&Ls) 
to a Ponzi scheme comes close to capturing  some of the points that we 
emphasize.7  Nevertheless, many economists still seem not to under- 
stand  that  a combination  of circumstances  in the 1980s  made  it very easy 
to loot a financial  institution  with little risk of prosecution.  Once this is 
2. The popular  books that  we have found  most useful  for understanding  the details  of 
what  actually  took place  in several  notorious  institutions  are  Adams  (1990),  Mayer  (1990), 
O'Shea  (1991),  Pizzo, Fricker,  and  Muolo  (1989),  Robinson  (1990),  and  Wilmsen  (1991). 
3. See, for example, Kane (1989),  White  (1991),  and Brumbaugh,  Carron,  and Litan 
(1989). 
4.  See Merton  (1978). 
5. Black  (1993b)  forcefully  makes  this point. 
6. See, for example, Benjamin  Friedman's  comments  on the paper  by Brumbaugh, 
Carron,  and  Litan  (1989). 
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clear, it becomes obvious that high-risk  strategies  that would pay off 
only in some states of the world  were only for the timid.  Why abuse the 
system  to pursue  a gamble  that  might  pay off when you can  exploit  a sure 
thing  with little risk  of prosecution? 
Our  description  of a looting strategy  amounts  to a sophisticated  ver- 
sion of having  a limited  liability  corporation  borrow  money, pay it into 
the private  account  of the owner, and  then default  on its debt. There  is, 
of course, a large literature  in corporate  finance that emphasizes the 
strategies that equity holders can use to exploit debt-holders  when 
shareholders  have limited  liability  .8 We have nothing  to add  to the analy- 
sis of this problem  in the context of transactions  between  people  or firms 
in the private  sector. The thrust  of this literature  is that  optimizing  indi- 
viduals  will not repeatedly  lend on terms  that  let them  be exploited, so if 
lending  occurs, some kind  of mechanism  (such as reputation,  collateral, 
or debt covenants)  that  protects  the lenders  must  be at work. 
However, this premise  may  not apply  to lending  arrangements  under- 
taken by the government.  Governments  sometimes  do things  that opti- 
mizing  agents  would  not do, and, because of their  power  to tax, can per- 
sist long after any other person or firm  would have been forced to stop 
because of a lack of resources. 
An Abstract Model of Looting 
A simple  three-period  model  can capture  the main  points  in the analy- 
sis of bankruptcy  for profit.  In this section, we use it to establish  three 
basic  results.  First, limited  liability  gives the owners  of a corporation  the 
potential  to exploit lenders. Second, if debt contracts let this happen, 
owners  will intentionally  drive  a solvent firm  bankrupt.  Third,  when the 
owners  of a firm  drive  it bankrupt,  they can cause great  social harm,  just 
as looters in a riot cause total losses that are  far  greater  than  the private 
gains  they capture. 
We warn  the reader  that our approach  in setting  up the model in this 
section differs from the approach  used in most other examinations  of 
contracts.  The typical  analysis starts  with a description  of an economic 
environment  and characterizes  efficient  contracts. Inefficient  contracts 
are  presumed  not to arise  in the market,  or at least not to persist  for long. 
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We start  from  the assumption  that the relevant  creditor,  the govern- 
ment, agrees  to an inefficient  contract  and  can persist  in it for some time. 
We offer no explicit theory of why the government  does this. Our  goal 
in the body of the paper  is merely  to characterize  the private  sector be- 
havior  that the inefficient  government  contracts  and regulations  can in- 
duce. Only in the conclusion do we hint at the more complicated  ques- 
tion of why governments  do what  they do. 
In addition  to assuming  that  contracts  are inefficient,  our  basic model 
relies  on perfect  certainty  and  the presence  of legal strategies  for  looting. 
Perfect certainty makes the models simpler, but more importantly,  it 
yields a starker  contrast  between the looting (go broke) strategies  that 
we emphasize and the subsidized risk-taking  (go-for-broke)  strategies 
that  have so far  dominated  most previous  explanations  by economists  of 
the S&L crisis.9  In the first presentation  of the model, the assumption 
that only legal transactions  occur is also useful in bringing  out the stark 
contrast  between the theory of looting and the theory of go-for-broke. 
We subsequently  show how the essence of the basic model carries  over 
to a model in which owners may actually  commit  fraud. 
Before  presenting  the three-period  model, it is useful  to make  our  ba- 
sic point in the simplest  possible setting  and to establish  some conven- 
tions that simplify our exposition. Let V denote the true value or net 
worth of a limited liability corporation.  Suppose that the government 
agrees to lend any amount  of money to this corporation,  subject  to the 
restriction  that  the owners  cannot  pay themselves  more  than  M. A single 
owner/manager  then faces a very simple decision. If M is less than V, 
the owner operates his corporation  according  to standard  principles  of 
value maximization.  The government  offer makes no difference  to the 
owner. But if M is greater  than V, the owner borrows  enough  from the 
government  to pay  M, knowing  full  well that  the corporation  will default 
on this debt in the future.  Worse still, in this case, the owner has no in- 
centive to ensure  that  the corporation  is well managed. 
This, in essence, is our story of what happened  at many  thrifts.  The 
details  come in describing  the regulations,  accounting  conventions, and 
opportunities  for illegal  payments  that  created  situations  in which  M ex- 
ceeded V. Three aspects of this story deserve comment. In what fol- 
9.  See Craine  (1992)  for a recent  description  of a model  with  uncertainty  that  can cap- 
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lows, we assume that there is no divergence  of interests  between man- 
agers  and  owners,  unless we explicitly  state  otherwise.  We do this partly 
to simplify  the exposition, but also because it accurately  characterizes 
the situation at many thrifts where the most important  abuses took 
place. A crucial  change in the regulations  in the 1980s  made it possible 
for a single  person  to own a thrift  or for a parent  company  to own a thrift 
as a subsidiary.  As one would expect, abusive strategies  are easier to 
implement  when ownership is concentrated  and managers  are tightly 
controlled  by owners. In fact, this is why bank  regulators  had enforced 
rules prohibiting  concentrated  ownership  until the 1980s. There were 
other thrifts  with widely dispersed  ownership  and serious divergences 
between the interests of managers  (who wanted to keep their  jobs and 
reputations)  and owners (who would have made much more money if 
the managers  had looted their institutions).  They missed out on the ac- 
tion that  we try to document. 
A second part  of this story-that  the government  is a direct  lender  to 
the firm-is  a pure convenience. In practice, private individuals  lend 
their deposits to a financial  institution  and the government  guarantees 
the debts of the institution.  For our purposes, this is equivalent  to as- 
suming that the depositor holds government debt and that the gov- 
ernment  lends money directly to the thrift. In either case, the result is 
the same when the thrift  defaults. It is the government  that suffers the 
loss. 
The third  part of this story-that  wealth is shifted  from the thrift  to 
the private  portfolio  of the owner  by means  of dividend  payments-is  an 
expositional  shortcut  that  should  not be taken  literally.  In fact, there  are 
many sweetheart  deals whereby an individual  or corporate  owner of a 
thrift  can extract  resources  from  it. These other ways are typically  ille- 
gal, but they can also be difficult  to regulate  and  prosecute. Importantly 
from  the point  of view of the owners, they can substantially  increase  the 
total amount  of wealth  that can be extracted  from  a thrift.  One example 
suggests  the range  of possibilities. In 1988,  the Southmark  Corporation 
exchanged  a group of companies  for some real estate holdings  of San 
Jacinto  Savings  and Loan of Houston, Texas, a wholly owned subsidi- 
ary of Southmark.  Because this was a transaction  between affiliated 
companies,  it required  regulatory  approval.  Based on a fairness  opinion 
provided by an investment banking  firm that valued the contributed 
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rable quantity  of real estate from San Jacinto. By 1990,  it had become 
clear that the value of the contributed  corporations  was actually neg- 
ative. 10 
The General Model 
We can now present the abstract  model that forms the core of the 
analysis.  It has no uncertainty  and  only three  periods,  dated  zero, 1, and 
2. The given market  interest  rate  is r, between  periods  zero and 1, and  r2 
between periods 1 and  2. 
A thrift  begins  life in period  zero with an investment  by the owners of 
an amount  WO.  The thrift  acquires  deposit liabilities  Lo  and purchases  a 
bundle  of assets, A, whose initial  value is Ao =  WO  + Lo. The thrift  is 
subject  to a net worth  or "capital"  requirement  imposed  by the govern- 
ment. This specifies  that  the net worth WO  must  be greater  than  or equal 
to cAo  for some constant  c. The assets yield a cash payment  of p,(A)  dol- 
lars in period 1 and p2(A)  dollars  in period  2. 
For simplicity,  assume that the investment  in the assets is not liquid 
and  that  the thrift  does not purchase  any new assets after  period  zero. In 
period 1, the thrift  receives cash payments  pl(A)  and  pays a dividend  Al 
to its owners. To accommodate  these transactions,  the thrift  adjusts  its 
deposit liabilities.  After these transactions,  the deposit liabilities  of the 
thrift  will be the deposits  from  the previous  period  with  accumulated  in- 
terest, (1 + r1)  Lo,  minus  the cash payment  pl(A),  plus  dividends  Al. This 
means  that  the thrift  can borrow-that is, take  in new deposits-to  make 
the dividend  payment  A1. 
In period 2, the investment  in the asset makes its final  payment  and 
the thrift  can be liquidated.  The thrift  receives payments  p2(A).  Deposit 
liabilities  from  period 1 with accumulated  interest  will be (1 + r2 )[(  1 + 
rl)LO  -  p,(A) +  A,]. The terminal net worth is the difference between 
the value of its assets and  its liabilities. 
If there were no limited  liability  and no deposit insurance,  the deci- 
sion problem  facing  the initial  investors  in the thrift  would  be to choose 
the bundle  of assets A to maximize  the present  discounted  value of the 
payments  from the thrift. (Because we shall later compare  the present 
value of the optimal  stream  of earnings  V* to the limit  on dividend  pay- 
10. FDIC v. Milken (1991, pp. 76-77). Geor-ge  A. Akeirlof  and Paul M. Romer  9 
ments, which is most naturally  expressed in period-one  units, it also 
makes  sense to express V*  as the period-one  present  value.) According 
to the preceding  description  of the earnings  stream, 
(I)  V* = maXA,6,  {p2(A) 
-  (  +  r2)[(1 +  rI)LO 
-  pl(A) + 
A,]}  (1) V  =  maAA1I  +  r2+A 
subject to  0  cAo c  WO. 
Because the two terms  involving  the dividend  payment  in period 1 can- 
cel, the only important  choice variable  in this maximization  problem  is 
the assets purchased  in period zero. Because the two terms involving 
dividends  cancel, this equation  can be simplified  to yield 
(2)  V* =  maxA [p2(A)/(1 +  r2)] +  pI(A) -  (1  +r )LO. 
subject to  0 c  cAo c  WO. 
Now suppose  that  this thrift  is a limited  liability  corporation.  Further 
suppose that the government  guarantees  the liabilities  of the thrift  and 
imposes an upper  bound  M(A) on the amount  of dividends  that  the thrift 
can pay to its owners in period 1. As the notation  suggests, this upper 
bound  could be a function  of the assets that  the thrift  holds. In this case, 
the maximization  problem  facing  the owners of the thrift  becomes 
(3)  E =  maxA,A1,A2  [A2/(1 +  r2)] +  A1 
subject  to 
0  cA  0  Wo 
A1  ?M(A), 
A2  ?  max {0, p2(A) -  (1 +  r2)[(1 +  rI)Lo  -  pl(A) +  A1]}. 
In this expression,  we introduce  the new symbol  E, the value  of the own- 
ers' equity, because it can differ from the true economic value of the 
thrift,  V*. 
To state the basic result  of this section, we need one final  definition. 
Let M* denote the maximum  of M(A) over all choices of A satisfying 
0 '  cAo ?  WO.  M* is the maximum  amount  of dividends  that can be ex- 
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PROPOSITION 
1. If M* is less than or equal to V*-the  period 1 maximum  value of 
the thrift's flow of payments-the  owners of the thrift  choose A to 
maximize  the true  value of the thrift. 
2. If M* is greater  than V* , the owners  of the thrift  choose A to maxi- 
mize M(A). They pay dividends  in period 1 equal to M* and default 
on the obligations  of the thrift  in period  2. 
PROOF 
The economic intuition  behind this result is very simple. If the 
owners  cannot  pay themselves more  than  the thrift  is worth  in period 
1, then the net worth  of the firm  is positive in the second period, and 
the choice of 0 in the maximum  for second period  dividends  becomes 
irrelevant.  In this case, the maximization  problem  in equation  3 with 
limited liability  reduces to the maximization  problem  in equation 1 
without  limited  liability  that  defines V*. 
If, on the other hand, the owners can pay themselves dividends 
greater  than the true economic value of the thrift, they will do so, 
even if this  requires  that  they invest in projects  with  negative  net pres- 
ent value. By the adding  up constraints,  when they can take out more 
than the thrift  is worth, they cause the thrift  to default  on its obliga- 
tions in period  2. If they are going to default,  the owners do not care 
if the investment  project  has a negative  net present  value because the 
government  suffers all of the losses on the project. As a result, the 
owners choose A solely with a view toward  maximizing  the amount 
of dividends  that  they can take out in period 1. 
(To derive  this result  formally,  substitute  the upper  bound  on divi- 
dends  in period  2 into the maximand  in equation  3 and  reverse the or- 
der of the two maximization  operators.) 
Two observations  follow immediately  from this result. First, if the 
owners  can extract  more  than  the true  economic value  of the thrift,  own- 
ers with  a positive  net  worth  will  voluntarily  choose to go bankrupt  by ex- 
tracting  resources  from  it. Bankruptcy  for  them  is a choice, not something 
that  is forced  on them  by circumstances.  Second, when  owners  choose A 
to maximize  M*, they  may  invest  in  negative  net  present  value  projects.  If 
so, the  gain  to the owners  from  the looting  strategy  is strictly  less than  the 
payouts  by the  government.  As a result,  society incurs  a net  loss. George A. Akeirlof and Pauil M. Romer  1  1 
These observations  illustrate  most starkly  the difference  between  the 
strategy  we emphasize-bankruptcy for profit-and the more familiar 
strategies  that depend  on excessive risk-taking.  According  to our strat- 
egy, the preferred  outcome for the owners of a solvent thrift  is the one 
in which the thrift goes bankrupt.  When the owners succeed in ex- 
tracting  more than the true economic value V*, they will exhibit pre- 
cisely the kind  of indifference  to how the thrift  is managed  that  one sees 
when one examines the daily operations  of many bankrupt  thrifts. Ac- 
cording  to the alternative  strategy  of excessive risk-taking,  the preferred 
outcome  for the owners is the one in which the gamble  pays off and the 
thrift remains solvent. If owners were following this strategy, they 
would be concerned  about the quality  of their  loans and the size of the 
operating  expenses that  they incur,  because every dollar  of loan loss or 
expense represents  a subtraction  from  their  gains  if the gamble  pays off. 
These results  also  justify our-use  of the term  looting. The bankruptcy 
for profit  strategy  can induce  large  losses to society as a whole because 
the dependence  of M on A can encourage  thrift  owners  to invest in nega- 
tive net present  value projects.  The next section shows how these kinds 
of incentives  were created  by the regulations  in place during  the 1980s. 
The model so far  has assumed  that  M(A),  the limit  on payments  in pe- 
riod 1, is given only by regulatory  and accounting rules, so that all 
choices made  by the thrifts  are  legal. Our  examples  of looting,  however, 
preponderantly  involve illegal  activities. In part, the high  proportion  of 
illegal  activities relative  to legal ones in our examples reflects a bias in 
our sources, which are mainly  derived  from evidence in legal proceed- 
ings. The looting that was legal or impossible  to prosecute never sur- 
faced in court or regulatory  proceedings.  But, in fact, we believe that 
the opportunities  for legal looting were relatively small relative to the 
opportunities  that include a large variety of ingenious side payments, 
with  varying  chances  of detection,  criminal  prosecution,  and  civil recov- 
ery. The model should  therefore  be extended  to include  both illegal  and 
legal means  of looting. 
To do this, let F denote the fraudulent  activities  undertaken  by man- 
agers. We make  two assumptions  about  F. First, an increase  in F leads 
to an increase  in the expected cost C(F) associated  with  the risk  of being 
prosecuted  or sued by the authorities.  These expected costs will depend 
on the probabilities  of losing in court  and  the cost of losing in a criminal 
or civil case. They will also depend on the attitudes  toward  risk of the 12  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1993 
managers  and owners, as well as the reputation  costs associated with 
legal action. 
The second effect of an increase  in F is an increase  in the amount  of 
total resources that could be extracted  by owners. Typically, these re- 
sources  would not take the form  of explicit  dividend  payments,  but  they 
still represent  reductions  in the net worth of the institutions.  From the 
point of view of the true position of the balance  sheet of the thrift,  they 
have the same effect as dividend  payments. Thus, we can expand our 
previous  expression  for the limits  on extracted  wealth  in the first  period 
M(A) and write M(A, F), with the understanding  that M is increasing 
in  F  nr. 
With  these extensions, our model  can now be written  as follows: 
(4)  E  =  maXA,F,A1,A2  A2/(1  +  r2)  +  A1 -  C(F) 
subject  to 
0  cAo Wo? 
A1  M(A, F), 
A2 C  max  {O,  p2(A)  -  (1 +  r2)[(1 +  r1)LO  -  pl(A) +  A1]}. 
The basic intuition  from the previous model carries over into this ex- 
tended model. A critical  value separates  the economics of value maxi- 
mization  from  the economics of bankruptcy  for profit.  As above, let V* 
denote  the maximized  value  of dividends  when  there  is no scope for loot- 
ing. In this case, let M* denote the value of the maximum  of M(A, F) - 
C(F)  over A and  F. This quantity  is the total monetary  value that  can be 
extracted  from the thrift  minus  the expected legal cost associated with 
the chosen level of fraud.  If M* is greater  than V*, owners  will loot; that 
is, they choose A and F to maximize  M(A, F) -  C(F). If,  on the other 
hand,  M* is less than V*,  they set F equal  to zero, choose A to maximize 
value, and  collect V*. 
In summary,  when V* is small, or when the amount  that can be ex- 
tracted  from  firms  with little chance of prosecution  is large,  looting and 
illegality  are likely to occur. Regulation,  proper  accounting,  and effec- 
tive enforcement  of the law are  necessary  to ensure  that V*  exceeds M*. 
There must be limits on legal payments  consistent with true economic 
returns.  In addition,  accounting  and regulatory  definitions  must make 
illegal  payments  easy to detect, prosecute, and  recover. George  A. Akerlof  and Pauil  M. Romer  13 
Examples of Looting 
For  financial  institutions,  one rule  that  limits  dividend  and  other  kinds 
of payouts  from  a thrift  is derived  from  the requirement  that  in every pe- 
riod,  the net worth  of the thrift  must  exceed the capital  specified  by regu- 
lators. In our  three-period  example, the dividend  limit, M, in period 1 is 
determined  by the requirement  that after  dividends  have been paid, the 
remaining  net worth of the thrift  must exceed the constant c times the 
book value of the asset. Thus in the model where thrifts  are operating 
legally,  M(A)  can be derived  exactly from  regulatory  constraints  and  ac- 
counting  definitions. 
Example  1: Inflated Net  Worth 
We begin with a point about accounting  rules that is so obvious that 
it would not be worth stating  had it not been so widely neglected  in dis- 
cussions of the crisis in the savings  and loan industry.  If net worth  is in- 
flated  by an artificial  accounting  entry  for goodwill, incentives  for loot- 
ing will be created. Because net worth imposes the critical  limit on the 
ability to extract value from a thrift,  each additional  dollar  of artificial 
net worth  translates  into an additional  dollar  of net worth  that  can be ex- 
tracted  from  the thrift.  In particular,  if the artificial  increase  in net worth 
is bigger  than  the total  required  capital,  the conditions  for looting  will be 
satisfied. This possibility was enhanced because the capital require- 
ment, c, was substantially  reduced  during  the 1980s. 
During  the 1980s,  an artificial  increment  to regulatory  net worth  could 
arise  for several different  reasons. In circumstances  in which one thrift 
purchased  another  thrift  with a negative  net worth, "goodwill"  was cre- 
ated  that  had  exactly the effect of the increment  described  here. Alterna- 
tively, many  thrifts  were allowed  to continue  in operation  after  their  true 
net worth  was substantially  negative. According  to regulatory  account- 
ing  principles,  an artificial  increment  to net worth  was created  to remove 
the legal obligation  that regulators  would otherwise have had to close 
such a thrift.  (We discuss both goodwill  accounting  and capital  require- 
ments  below.) 
Overstated  net worth  by itself does not induce  the owners  of a thrift  to 
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incentive  to manage  a thrift  carefully.  As a result, net losses to society 
from  mismanagement  of the thrift  are likely. 
Example 2: Riding the  Yield Curve 
Suppose that a thrift is allowed no goodwill in calculating  its net 
worth,  but  is given the opportunity  to invest in assets that  generate  exag- 
gerated  first-period  accounting  income. Then the thrift  will once again 
be able to pursue  bankruptcy  for profit. 
To use a simple example, consider long bonds. Because there is no 
uncertainty  in the model, arbitrage  implies  that a two-period  long bond 
issued at par  in period  zero would have to pay a coupon, rL,  satisfying 
(5)  (1 +  rL) +  (1 +  r2)rL= (1 +  r1)(1 +  r2)- 
Neglecting the cross terms r2  rL  and r, r2  gives the usual approximation 
from a pure expectations  theory of the yield curve, rL =  (r1 +  r2)12.  We 
will be interested  in the case where spot rates are increasing  over time, 
so assume that r2>  rL> rl. 
According  to accounting  conventions  that are still used for a bank  or 
thrift  that plans to hold long bonds to maturity,  a long bond held in the 
investment  portfolio  of a thrift  would be valued  at par  in period 1, even 
though  the market  value of the bond would be strictly  less than  par  be- 
cause interest  rates are rising  over time. (All that  is required  for this ac- 
counting  treatment  is an intention  by the thrift  to hold the bond  to matu- 
rity.) According to  this convention, the accounting return on  the 
investment in the bond is its coupon rL,  which by our assumptions  is 
strictly  greater  than  the true  economic  return  rl. If the difference  is large 
enough to satisfy 
(6)  rL-rI-c?O, 
the conditions  required  to pursue  bankruptcy  for profit  will be satisfied. 
For many thrifts, the effective value of c could be very small, so that 
only a small  differential  between the accounting  rate  of return  rL  and  the 
true  economic  rate  of return  r, on assets would  be needed  to make  bank- 
ruptcy  for profit  attractive. 
Under these circumstances,  all a thrift  would need to do to exploit 
bankruptcy  for profit  is to raise its funds  at the prevailing  short  rate (for 
example,  in the market  for certificates  of deposit),  invest in higher-yield- 
ing long bonds,  and pay out all of its accounting  earnings (rL -  r,)A George A. Akerlof and Pauil M. Romer-  15 
as dividends.  If rL -  r1  is equal to c, then in the first period, the owners 
will be able to use artificial  profits to extract their initial investment, 
Wo  = cA, without  violating  the net worth  requirements  specified  by the 
regulations.  If rL  -  r1  is greater  than  c (or if the yield differential  persists 
for several periods in a multiperiod  model), the owners can take out 
more  than  the value of their  initial  investment. 
When  period  2 arrives,  the thrift  will be obligated  to pay a rate of re- 
turn on its deposits that exceeds the yield on its bonds. If the owners 
have been able to extract  more than  the current  value of their initial  in- 
vestment, then the thrift  will not be able to make  good on this commit- 
ment and  the government  will have to take over its obligations. 
Note that in contrast  to the first  example, the rule determining  divi- 
dend payouts in this example  does give thrifts  an incentive to purchase 
a particular  kind of asset, but it is not one with a negative net present 
value. Hence, as in the first example, the accounting  rules do not give 
owners a direct incentive to make a negative net present value invest- 
ment. As in all cases of bankruptcy  for profit,  however, the owners  have 
no stake in future  gains and  losses at a thrift,  and  therefore  will be indif- 
ferent  to actions that  cause social losses. 
It is tempting  to conclude  that  this example  represents  an instance  in 
which a thrift  takes a gamble  and exposes itself to interest  rate risk, but 
this interpretation  is misleading.  In this perfect  certainty  model, there  is 
no risk. The outcome here is perfectly  foreseeable. Moreover,  as noted 
above, the outcome that is preferred  for the owners is the one in which 
the thrift  is left insolvent,  not the one in which  it has a positive net worth. 
The strategy  of riding  an upward-sloping  yield curve  that  is illustrated 
here is not one that was particularly  important  during  the 1980s,  but it 
does illustrate  the essence of the point  that  we are  trying  to make. If reg- 
ulations  make use of accounting  values that differ  from true economic 
or market  values, this creates opportunities  for abusive behavior that 
can be consistent  with the letter  of the law. 
Preventing  this kind  of abuse is also very simple.  If all long bonds are 
marked  to market  in period  1, no artificial  accounting  earnings  are  gener- 
ated. It is a revealing  fact about  the regulatory  process and  about  the ac- 
counting  profession  that  historical  prices  may still be used to value gov- 
ernment  securities  that  are to be held to maturity.  "  I 
11.  See Floyd Norris, "Bond-Accounting  Shift Is Approved," New  York  Times, April 
14, 1993, p. C1. 16  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Example 3: Acquisition,  Development,  and Construction Loans 
For a thrift  that  is interested  in bending  accounting  rules  and  overstat- 
ing net worth, acquisition,  development,  and  construction  (ADC)  loans 
are an example  of a thrift  asset that offered  particularly  rich opportuni- 
ties for booking  artificial  accounting  earnings.  Real estate investments 
also created opportunities  for owners to make side payments  to them- 
selves in a way that was difficult  for regulators  to monitor  and for law 
authorities  to prosecute  successfully. 
In the most extreme cases, an ADC loan took the following  form. A 
thrift would make a no-recourse loan to a land developer, offering 
enough  money to purchase  a tract  of land, construct  a building,  pay the 
developer  a development  fee, pay the thrift  an initial  origination  fee on 
the loan (typically  about 2.5 percent of the loan amount),  and pay the 
interest on the loan for the first several years of the project. The thrift 
could inflate  its accounting  income for several years by finding  an un- 
scrupulous  individual  with little development  experience, and making 
the following  offer. Without  putting  any money into the project,  the de- 
veloper could borrow  money and collect development  fees and salary 
income  for several  years. In return,  the developer  would  agree  to "pay" 
the thrift  some of its own money in what appeared  to be payments  on a 
loan with a very high interest  rate. Because the developer would have 
little  or no experience  in development,  the project  would  have a negative 
net present  value. This fact alone would  be sufficient  to ensure  an even- 
tual default  on the loan by the developer in most cases. The unrealisti- 
cally high interest  rate on the loan would virtually  guarantee  a default. 
Because the loan  would  be a no-recourse  loan, the developer  could  walk 
away from the project keeping his fees, without putting  his personal 
wealth  at stake. 
Neglecting for simplicity the origination  fees  (which technically 
would  generate  income  in period  zero), we can treat  this loan as an asset 
that pays a very high accounting  return  in period 1 equal  to the interest 
rate  on the loan. As in the last example,  all that  is required  for looting  to 
be profitable  is that  the analog  of the inequality  in equation  6 be satisfied. 
The  excess accounting  profit  that  the thrift  can earn  over its cost of funds 
need only be large  enough  to exceed the capital  requirement,  c, which, 
as we have already  noted, could have been quite small. George A. Akerlof and Paul M. Romer  17 
In contrast  to riding  the yield curve, this arrangement  is very difficult 
to police because real  estate projects  that  are under  construction  are in- 
herently  difficult  to value. Because reserves are created  to make  the ini- 
tial interest  payments  when the loan was taken out, the loan cannot go 
into default in period 1. If a suspicious regulator  or accountant  chal- 
lenges the value of the collateral  backing  up the loan, the thrift  owner 
can arrange  for a cooperating  appraiser  to certify that the value of the 
project  is sufficient  to protect  against  loss on the loan. If necessary, the 
thrift  (or  a cooperating  thrift)  can make  a loan  to a new developer  to pur- 
chase the project  from the first developer at a profit, "proving"  with a 
market  price  the appraisal's  validity.  In period  2, the developer  defaults, 
the "highly  profitable"  thrift  suddenly  is insolvent, and the government 
must  provide  funds  to pay off the depositors. 
We want to emphasize  that  an honest developer  would  not enter into 
this kind of agreement  with the thrift. Even if the developer cannot be 
held personally  responsible  for the loan once the project  defaults, a de- 
fault  on a major  project  would damage  the reputation  of a reputable  de- 
veloper  and limit  the ability  to borrow  in the future,  especially once the 
abusive  nature  of the arrangements  becomes clear. As a result,  the own- 
ers of the thrift  have an incentive  to seek out the most unscrupulous  "de- 
velopers,"  the ones that it can count on to report  grossly overstated  in- 
terest payments  in early years and then to default  in subsequent  years. 
Because high dividend  payments  are likely to attract  regulators'  atten- 
tion, other means of extracting  money from  the thrift  are in most cases 
more profitable,  such as no-recourse  financing  for an overvalued  pur- 
chase of land  from  the owners  or participation  in other  sweetheart  deals. 
All of these activities entail some risk of prosecution  if they are done 
flagrantly,  but if they are undertaken  with care, they are very difficult  to 
prosecute. The perverse incentives created  for the owners of the thrift 
will propagate  through  the economy, creating  misleading  price signals 
and perverse incentives in other parts of the economy. The owners of 
the thrift  pursue  bankruptcy  for profit,  but now, so do the symbiotic  de- 
velopers  that  it attracts. 
In this case, it is clear that bankruptcy  for profit  fully lives up to our 
definition  of looting. The development  projects that are undertaken  in 
this kind of arrangement  would typically have a net present value that 
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that went into default  were of such poor quality  that the buildings  that 
had been built  were simply  bulldozed. 
The Financial Crisis in Chile 
In the previous  example  of riding  the yield curve, the depository  insti- 
tution holds assets that pay a high current  yield. Its liabilities,  by con- 
trast, have a low current  yield. The yield spread  results in high current 
accounting  income  that  can be paid  out to shareholders.  This current  ac- 
counting  income is, however, not the true  economic return  on the port- 
folio, because part  of that  high  current  yield merely  offsets an expected 
depreciation  in the capital  value  of the long-lived  assets. The anticipated 
fall in asset values is associated  with an expected increase  in short-term 
interest  rates. 
In this section, we describe a related case, one in which the antici- 
pated decrease in asset values comes from  an expected depreciation  in 
exchange  rates. In this case, the artificial  accounting  income  can be gen- 
erated  by a mismatch  between  the currencies  in which  assets and  liabili- 
ties are denominated  instead  of a mismatch  in the duration  of the assets 
and  liabilities. 
To show how a bank  can exploit an expected depreciation  of the cur- 
rency under a fixed exchange rate system, suppose that the following 
four  conditions  hold. First,  the assets of the bank  are  denominated  in the 
home currency  (which  we will call pesos). Second, the liabilities  of the 
bank are denominated  in the foreign currency  (which we will call dol- 
lars). Third,  there is an expected devaluation  of the peso relative  to the 
dollar (that is, an expected fall in the number  of dollars  offered in ex- 
change  for one peso) that is mirrored  in a nominal  interest  rate on peso 
loans that  exceeds the nominal  interest  rate  on dollar  loans. Fourth,  dol- 
lar  lenders  charge  a bankruptcy  premium  on their  loans to the bank  that 
is less than  actuarially  fair  because they have confidence  that the peso- 
issuing government  will assume responsibility  for the dollar-denomi- 
nated  borrowing  by its banks. 
Under these conditions, the bank can consider the difference be- 
tween interest payments in pesos and interest payments in dollars as 
current  profit, and these can be paid out as bank earnings.  Of course, 
this profit  is illusory, because the high rate on pesos relative  to dollars George A. Akeilof  and Paull M. Romer  19 
reflects  the expected  devaluation.  A correct  system  of accounting  would 
set aside all of the extra  earnings  from  the interest  rate  premium  as a re- 
serve against  future losses in asset values arising  from changes in the 
exchange  rate. But if the official  policy is that  no change  in the exchange 
rate  will occur, it is difficult  for  government  regulators  to insist  that  firms 
accrue  this kind  of reserve. 
The preceding  outline suggests how fixed exchange rates and mis- 
leading  accounting  can encourage  a pattern  of bankruptcy  for profit  that 
ultimately  results in an economy-wide  financial  crisis. No actual  finan- 
cial crisis will ever be quite this simple  because bank  regulators  will try 
to stop  the bankruptcy  for  profit  scheme  that  we have  just described;  fur- 
thermore,  illegal, as well as legal, means will be used to extract pay- 
ments. It is therefore  useful to review at least one actual  devaluation  to 
see whether  it is the regulators  or the looters who come out ahead. Be- 
cause there  are several  excellent accounts  of the Chilean  financial  crisis 
of 1982  that  leave relatively  little ambiguity  about  the facts, we focus on 
this case.12 
In 1979,  the reformers  of the Chilean  economy had achieved consid- 
erable  success. Inflation  in the consumer  price  index (CPI)  had  fallen  to 
38 percent per year, from an annual  peak of more than 600 percent in 
1973. Real gross domestic product had grown by 30 percent over the 
four-year  period from 1975  to 1979.13  Structural  changes involving re- 
duced  protection  of domestic  industry  had  resulted  in a rapid  expansion 
of the manufacturing  sector. 
Emboldened  by these successes, the economic ministers  decided to 
go one step further.  They would end inflation  by slowing  the rate of de- 
valuation  of the currency  and  then fixing  the peso-dollar  exchange  rate. 
In June 1979,  this permanent  rate  was established  at 39 pesos to the dol- 
lar.  14  Over  the next nine months,  restrictions  on capital  inflows  and  out- 
flows were greatly  relaxed, including  restrictions  on banks'  foreign  lia- 
bilities. But for reasons mainly outside the operation of the financial 
sector, the pegging  of the exchange  rate proved  to be unrealistic.  Infla- 
tion had  a momentum  of its own and  could  not be halted  immediately.  In 
particular,  union  wages were fully  indexed  to past inflation.  Thus  even if 
12. See Edwards  and Edwards  (1991), de la Cuadra  and Valdes (1992), McKinnon 
(1991),  and  Velasco  (1991). 
13. Edwards  and  Edwards  (1991,  table  2-1, p. 28, and  table 1-3,  p. 12). 
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inflation  had  abruptly  stopped  (as the planners  had  hoped),  wages would 
have still  risen  substantially  because  of past  increases  in the CPI.  In fact, 
both wages and the general  price level continued  to rise even after the 
exchange  rate  was pegged. Inflation  did indeed  decelerate,  but  from  the 
third  quarter  of 1979  to the last quarter  of 1981,  the real exchange rate 
(in pesos per dollar, adjusted  for inflation  in each country)  appreciated 
by 50 percent.  Blue collar  real  wages grew by 20 percent  from  May 1979 
to May 1981. For 1981 as a whole, the CPI inflation rate was 9.9 
percent.  '5 
The peso exchange  rate  thus  became  steadily  more  and  more  overval- 
ued, and as time passed, there were growing  reasons to expect the offi- 
cial policy of a fixed exchange  rate  to collapse with a devaluation  of the 
peso. There  were virtually  no restrictions  on the flows of capital, so the 
peso interest rate should have rapidly  approached  something  close to 
the rate implied  by uncovered interest parity-the  dollar  rate plus the 
expected rate of depreciation.  In the absence of any further  regulations 
on bank  behavior,  the banks  could have borrowed  dollars  and  loaned in 
pesos, as described  above, with the difference  between the interest  re- 
ceived and  the interest  paid  considered  as current  income. 
Bank regulators  were aware of exchange rate risk and required  that 
banks match their dollar  assets with their dollar  liabilities.  16 Banks re- 
sponded,  in effect, by converting  exchange  rate  risk  into credit  risk  that 
regulators  could  not monitor.  To see how this  is possible, consider  a sim- 
ple example. Suppose that a bank borrows  from a major  international 
bank  at the London  Interbank  Offered  Rate (LIBOR).  The international 
bank  is willing  to lend  to the Chilean  bank  without  charging  a default  pre- 
mium  because it is sure that the Chilean  government  would assume the 
debts of the bank if it were to fail. Suppose that a firm  borrows  dollars 
from the bank and invests the proceeds in peso-denominated  financial 
assets. This firm  is now in a position to engage in looting based on the 
mismatch  between the currencies  in which its assets and liabilities  are 
denominated.  It enjoys  a large  spread  between  its current  income  and  its 
cost of borrowing;  it can therefore  report substantial  current  earnings 
and pay these out as dividends,  with the expectation  that it will default 
on its dollar  loans when the peso finally  depreciates. 
15. Edwards  and Edwards  (1991, table 3-9, p. 75; table 6-7, p. 158;  and table 2-1 
p.  28). 
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Of course, any bank that is trying  to maximize  economic value will 
not lend to the firm  on terms that would make looting possible; but the 
bank  in our  example  is willing  to do so because it too has an incentive  to 
loot. As in the case of a thrift  engaged  in ADC  lending  with  a cooperating 
developer,  the bank  and  the borrower  have the same  incentive  to pursue 
bankruptcy  for profit.  To make the example concrete, let us apply our 
example  to the interest  rates  prevailing  from 1979  to 1981,  during  the pe- 
riod when exchange rates were fixed in Chile. The annual  rate on peso 
loans  from  Chilean  banks  was around  50 percent,  the rate  on dollar  loans 
about  20 percent,  and  the LIBOR  rate  roughly  15  percent.  17 Given  these 
rates, the bank  in our  example  can lend  dollars  to the firm  at a 20 percent 
annual  interest rate, knowing  full well that the firm  will default on its 
loans when  the currency  is realigned.  The bank  now has dollar  liabilities 
on its books on which it pays 15 percent interest and matching  dollar 
assets (as required  by the regulations)  on which it collects 20 percent  in- 
terest. (Banks  were presumably  limited  in their  ability  to charge  higher 
rates  because  an implausibly  large  spread  over LIBOR  would  have been 
a clear signal  that something  other  than  a standard  arms-length  transac- 
tion was taking  place.) Until the depreciation  takes place, the bank  can 
report  strong  profits  and  pay large  dividends.  At the same  time, the firm 
can report  as income the spread  between its 20 percent  cost of funds on 
dollar  loans and  its 50 percent  return  on its peso loans. 
As the yield-curve  and ADC examples  given above show, this strat- 
egy requires  that  both  the bank  and  the firm  be able  to report  and  pay out 
artificial  earnings  that are greater  than the total equity that the owners 
have in each corporation.  The inequality  in equation  6 shows that this 
will be possible if the yield differential  times the holding  period  (which 
in this case is the expected time  until  the depreciation)  is greater  than  the 
ratio  of net worth  to total assets. It does not take a big spread  between 
the dollar  and  peso interest  rates  for a bank  to be able to meet this condi- 
tion because net worth-to-asset  ratios  for banks  are so small. It was not 
the case, however, that  economic  conditions  forced  all banks  into bank- 
ruptcy.  The conservatively  managed  Banco del Estado  de Chile  and  the 
local affiliates  of foreign  banks did not follow a strategy  of bankruptcy 
for  profit  and  did  not become insolvent  when the devaluation  took place. 
If a firm  has substantial  equity, and regulators  can monitor  and limit 
17.  McKinnon (1991, table 3-5, p. 39). 22  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
the debt-to-equity  ratio  for the borrowers  from  banks, it can take a large 
interest  rate spread  to make  looting  profitable.  But for firms  that are al- 
ready on the verge of bankruptcy,  it takes virtually  no spread  at all. In 
Chile in 1981,  there were many such firms. Faced with an appreciating 
exchange  rate, very large  rises in real  wages, and  double-digit  real  inter- 
est rates (that  is, peso interest  rates minus  the peso CPI inflation  rate), 
many Chilean  entrepreneurs  had little remaining  capital  in their enter- 
prises. Any such enterprise  that  could remain  alive in the absence of the 
peso depreciation,  but  that  would  fail when the peso depreciated,  would 
have been willing  to pay a premium  above the dollar  rate of interest  for 
a dollar loan. These firms would have preferred  dollar loans to peso 
loans, as long as the dollar  rate of interest  did not exceed the peso rate 
of interest.  As a result,  the banks  had  a source  of demand  for  dollar  loans 
that induced  them to borrow  abroad  from New York banks, who were 
anxious  to lend to them  at little more  than  the dollar  interest  rate. Thus, 
for example,  the construction  industry  increased  its dollar-denominated 
debt by 284 percent in 1981  alone.'8  The increased demand  for dollar 
loans by Chilean  banks is shown by a ten-fold  increase in their foreign 
indebtedness  from 1978  to 1982,  accounting  for 70 percent of the total 
increase  in Chilean  private  indebtedness  over this period.  19 
As described,  this arrangement  gives the bulk  of the profits  from  loot- 
ing to the firms  that can exploit the yield spread.  Judging  only from the 
interest  rate  data, banks  apparently  were able to capture  relatively  little 
of the loot. This conclusion,  however, is based on the mistaken  assump- 
tion that  the banks  were not related  to the borrowers.  In fact, most large 
Chilean  banks were part of a business grupo (or interlocking  group of 
firms  like a Japanese  keiretsu).  By having  a bank  in the group  lend to a 
firm  in the same  grupo  and  then  having  the firm  lend at the peso rate, the 
owners could capture  the entire  spread  of 35 percentage  points  between 
LIBOR and the domestic peso  rate. Retrospective analyses have 
attached  great importance  to the role of the banks in such self-dealing 
between the banks and the firms in the corresponding  group.20  Ac- 
cording to James Tybout, grupo firms borrowed  from their affiliated 
banks  at preferential  rates, and  purchased  equity  in affiliated  companies 
18. See de la Cuadra  and  Valdes  (1992,  p. 86). 
19. See Edwards  and  Edwards  (1991,  table  3-8, p. 71). 
20. See Edwards  and Edwards  (1991, pp. 100-01)  and the discussion  by McKinnon 
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to boost share prices, thus transferring  gains to their owners through 
share  price  appreciation  rather  than  through  direct  dividend  payments.2' 
In addition,  loans by banks to grupo firms  were one of the two largest 
uses of foreign  dollar  borrowings,  matched  only by trade  financing. 
The Looting of Savings and Loans during the 1980s 
This section relates  the abstract  discussion  of looting  to the facts con- 
cerning  the savings  and loan crisis in the United States. We make  three 
basic points. First, changes in regulations  and accounting  conventions 
encouraged  the strategies  for looting described in the theoretical sec- 
tion. They also increased  the amount  of wealth that could be extracted 
by someone who was willing  to incur  any given level of risk of prosecu- 
tion. We document  the most important  changes in regulation  and con- 
nect them to the models. Second, we examine  detailed  accounts of the 
savings  and  loan crisis  for indications  that  looting  did  indeed  take place. 
We find  abundant  evidence of investments  designed  to yield artificially 
high accounting  profits  and strategies  designed  to pay large  sums to of- 
ficers and shareholders.  Third,  by adding  up the available  accounts of 
looting, it becomes clear that looting  could have been a significant  con- 
tributor  to the S&L crisis. 
Changes  in Regulations 
At the beginning  of the 1980s,  the U.S. savings  and  loan industry  was 
in deep trouble. As has been widely noted, regulations  had induced 
S&Ls to hold a mismatched  portfolio of assets and liabilities  that ex- 
posed them  to significant  interest  rate  risk. By 1980,  many  honestly run 
S&Ls had a negative net worth. The industry  as a whole was under 
water by more than $100 billion.22  The deposit insurance  fund did not 
have enough  assets to cover its liabilities. 
The federal  government  had the choice of letting  the insurance  fund 
fail, making  up the difference  with tax revenue, or changing  the rules. 
Letting  depositors  lose their deposits was unthinkable.  Explicitly bail- 
ing  out the insurance  fund  was inconvenient.  So the rules  were changed. 
21.  Tybout (1986, p. 378). 
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These rules were changed  in two principal  ways: first, by amending  the 
accounting  definition  of current  income; and second, by changing  the 
definition  of net worth  or capitalization.  These changes  were enshrined 
in the RAP (Regulatory  Accounting Procedures),  which replaced the 
GAAP (Generally  Accepted Accounting  Procedures)  as the accounting 
standards  required  by regulators.  Furthermore,  the official policy be- 
came one of "forbearance." 
At the same time, thrifts  suddenly  found themselves freer to choose 
their  investment  activities  and set deposit interest  rates  as they wished. 
First, the Depository  Institutions  Deregulation  and  Monetary  Decontrol 
Act of 1980  and the Garn-St.  Germain  Depository Institutions  Act of 
1982  removed many of the restrictions  that had previously applied to 
asset-holdings  by thrifts.  As thrifts  switched  from state to federal  char- 
ters to take advantage  of the new opportunities,  some states (Texas and 
California,  for example) reacted by adopting  even more liberal rules. 
Second, by eliminating  limits  on the rates  that  could  be paid  on deposits, 
Garn-St.  Germain  not only removed  the last vestige of franchise  value 
that  had  helped  deter  looting  in the past, but  it also, in effect, gave thrifts 
an unlimited  ability to borrow from the government.  To place a new 
claim on the deposit insurance  system, which was implicitly  backed by 
the government,  thrifts  had only to take in new deposits. Previously, 
they had  been limited  to geographically  restricted,  nonprice  competition 
as a means of attracting  deposits. With  the removal  of interest  rate lim- 
its, the only constraint  on the behavior  of thrifts  was the severely weak- 
ened system of capitalization  or net worth  requirements.  The emergence 
of a nationwide  system of brokers  who matched  depositors  with thrifts 
was an inevitable  response  to this change. 
The ability  to purchase  a more diverse set of assets made the valua- 
tion of the portfolio  held by a thrift  more  difficult  and  created  opportuni- 
ties for overvaluation  of net worth  that  could  be manipulated  by individ- 
ual thrifts. Increases in the amount that a thrift could lend to one 
borrower  also enhanced  the ability  of thrift  owners  and  borrowers  to col- 
lude by funding  and  carrying  out negative  net worth  projects  that  gener- 
ated extractable  gains. Traditionally,  thrift ownership had to be dis- 
persed among  at least 400 shareholders,  with no individual  shareholder 
holding  more than 10 percent  of the equity, and no group  holding  more 
than  25 percent. An additional  rule change  made it possible for a single George A. Akerlof and Paul  M. Romeer  25 
individual  to own his or her own thrift,  making  it even easier  for owners 
to structure  the affairs  of the thrift  for private  benefit.23 
The strategy  of forbearance  in dealing  with  thrifts  that  could not meet 
their  capital  requirements  was supplemented  by a significant  weakening 
of the capital  requirements  themselves. At the beginning  of the 1980s, 
capital  requirements  specified  that the book value of equity  had to be 5 
percent  of the book value of an institution's  assets. By January  1982,  the 
capital requirement  had been reduced to 3 percent.24  Moreover, new 
thrifts  were given 20 years to reach  the required  capital  levels, so an en- 
trant  into the industry  needed to maintain  only net worth equal to 0.15 
percent  of assets.25  Rapidly  growing  thrifts  were also allowed to use an 
average of assets of the previous four years' and the current year's 
(much  larger)  assets.26  Thrift  owners, who were often land  developers, 
could also deed land or other assets that were difficult  to value to their 
thrift  as a contribution  to capital. 
The new RAP  rules, together  with  generous  interpretations  of the tra- 
ditional  GAAP rules, created many different  ways in which net worth 
could be overstated. Institutions  with significantly  negative net worth 
could then remain  open, report  profits, and, in most cases, make pay- 
outs to managers  and owners. S&Ls could value at current market 
prices  some assets that  increased  in value, yet retain  losers on the books 
at historical  cost. Losses on assets that were sold could also be amor- 
tized over the maturity  of the assets rather  than incurred  instantane- 
ously, as they should  be under  any economically  rational  system of ac- 
counting.27 
Regulators  were not, of course, completely blind to the potential 
problems  that their strategy created. For example, when the Federal 
Home Loan Bank  Board,  the regulatory  agency  of the S&Ls, first  began 
to issue "net  worth certificates"- pieces of paper  that were treated  as 
increments  to the net worth of an insolvent institution-it insisted that 
the recipients cease dividend payments until the certificates  were no 
longer  needed. However, once the pattern  of forbearance  and  stretching 
23. See Mayer  (1990,  p. 63). 
24. See Breeden  (1990,  p. 8). 
25. See Breeden  (1990,  p. 8). 
26. See Breeden  (1990,  pp. 8-9). 
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of the accounting  rules became the norm,  the regulators'  ability  to limit 
opportunism  rapidly  diminished. 
A particularly  important  accounting  provision concerned the treat- 
ment of the intangible  assets or "goodwill"  created  when one thrift  ac- 
quired  another.  Traditional  GAAP  accounting  rules specified  that when 
an acquiring  firm  paid more for a target  than its book value, the differ- 
ence was identified  as an intangible  asset that  was added  to the books of 
the acquiring  firm  and depreciated  over an appropriate  period of time. 
In the world  of value  maximization,  this is sensible.  If someone  is willing 
to pay more  than  book value, the firm  must  possess some hidden  assets. 
But in the world  of bankruptcy  for profit,  this procedure  can lead to seri- 
ously misleading accounting procedures. Traditionally,  the Federal 
Home Loan Bank  Board  instructed  thrifts  to limit  this period  to no more 
than  ten years, but  in 1981,  this  restriction  was removed  and  thrifts  could 
use the absolute  upper  bound  of forty years under  GAAP  rules.28 
To illustrate  the effects of this decision, consider  the following  exam- 
ple. Suppose  that  a troubled  thrift  had mortgages  with a face value of $4 
billion but a market  value of $3 billion because interest rates had in- 
creased. Suppose  that  it had  deposit liabilities  of $3.8 billion, and  there- 
fore a negative  net worth  of $800  million.  If another  thrift  acquired  this 
thrift  at zero cost by taking  over its assets and liabilities,  it put $3.8 bil- 
lion in new deposit liabilities  on its books. Because the transaction  had 
a market  price of zero, it also put the $3 billion  in new mortgage  assets 
on its books, together  with $800  million  of intangible  "goodwill"  assets. 
From the point of view of the regulators,  this paper  transaction  meant 
that the measured  capital  of the industry  had increased  by $800  million 
and that an insolvent institution  had been resolved. Income at the ac- 
quiring  thrift  would  be directly  reduced,  because  the market  value  of the 
target  was negative. With  interest  rates of 10  percent,  the net reduction 
in income  would  be 10  percent  of the difference  between  $3.8 billion  and 
$3 billion, or $80  million  per year. 
In the usual world of value maximization,  of course, it never makes 
sense for an acquiring  firm  to accept $800  million  in net new obligations 
for free. But in the world of bankruptcy  for profit, this extravagance 
made  perfect  sense because it allowed  the acquiring  firm  to pay out more 
dividends  than  would  otherwise  have been possible. Over  time, both  the 
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goodwill and the discount from par on the mortgage  assets disappear, 
but  the accounting  treatment  lets this happen  at different  rates. If the av- 
erage  life of the outstanding  mortgages  were seven years (a typical  value 
because mortgages  are repaid  when a house is sold), the acquiring  thrift 
would be allowed to book one-seventh of the discount from par as in- 
come each year. In this case, it would  generate  $143  million  ($1  billion/7) 
in additional  accounting  income each year. Because the goodwill  would 
be depreciated  over  forty  years, the subtraction  from  accounting  income 
in each year  would  be only $20  million.  Over  the course  of the first  seven 
years after the acquisition,  this difference  would generate  $123 million 
per year in artificial  income. Net of the real  reduction  of $80  million  per 
year, this would  imply  an additional  $43 million  in dividends  that could 
be paid out each year for the next seven years. After seven years, the 
discount  from face value would be gone and even accounting  earnings 
would be strictly  lower. But in seven years, the current  owners would 
presumably  be long gone. Many  thrift  owners  were quick  to take advan- 
tage of  this loophole: in  1982 alone, S&Ls booked $15 billion in 
goodwill.29 
Another  particularly  important  accounting  provision  was the new le- 
niency concerning  S&L income from ADC loans to real estate devel- 
opers. The Garn-St.Germain  Act removed  the traditional  limits on the 
mortgage  loan-to-value  ratio,30  and-even  better,  from  the looters' per- 
spective-allowed  the value of the project  itself to include interest re- 
serves to pay the interest  on the loan for the first several years, as well 
as a 2 to 4 percent  developer's  fee that could be taken out at the begin- 
ning. This meant  that a developer  could start  a real estate development 
project  with no equity  of his own at stake, and  pocket a large  initial  fee. 
Thanks  to the interest  reserves, both the developer  and the thrift  could 
operate  free of any  fear  of default  for  years, even if the project  being  built 
were completely worthless.31 The new Regulatory  Accounting  Proce- 
dures  also allowed the S&Ls to book as current  income an origination 
fee of up to 2.5 percent of the loan value.32  While correct accounting 
would  have required  loan-loss reserves to be set aside against  the risks 
of loss, practice  frequently  differed.  In Texas, for example, accounting 
29. Breeden  (1990,  p. 24). 
30. See Kane  (1989). 
31. O'Shea(1991,  p.55). 
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practices  allowed both the nominal  interest  income and the origination 
fee to be booked  as profit-even  if the developer  never  contributed  a sin- 
gle dollar  of his own wealth  to the project. 
These accounting  arrangements  created the perfect opportunity  for 
developers and thrifts to collude in looting by creating overvalued 
assets, as described  earlier.  Developers created  projects  that were ini- 
tially given artificially  inflated  accounting  valuations  and subsequently 
went  bankrupt,  with  thrifts  lending  all the funds  needed  to keep the proj- 
ect in business  for several  years. This scam  ultimately  became  known  as 
the "Texas  strategy"  for looting. The effects of this strategy  on the real 
estate market  are the subject  of the next section. 
Among  the many provisions  reducing  the restrictions  on asset hold- 
ings, the Garn-St.  Germain  Act of 1982  also allowed  thrifts  to engage  in 
commercial  lending  and therefore  to purchase  junk bonds. Junk  bonds 
offered  the same  kind  of yield spread  described  in the yield curve exam- 
ple and  exploited  in Chile. Correct  accounting  would  have required  a re- 
serve  to offset the high  default  rate  onjunk  bonds,33  but  lacking  adequate 
supervision  requiring  risk set-asides, thrifts  could report  virtually  all of 
the interest  income on junk bonds as current  income. The implications 
of this arrangement  for the market  for  junk bonds are discussed later  in 
the paper. 
Evidence  of Looting 
We have seen that the changes in regulations  of S&Ls in the early 
1980s  created  opportunities  for looting.  But did  many  owners  in fact loot 
their  institutions?  If they did, did they mainly  purchase  high-risk  assets 
in the hope that  they would sometimes  create  large  positive earnings  for 
their institutions?  Or were looting strategies  that drained  as much in- 
come as possible  also an important  factor  in the ultimate  cost of the S&L 
bailout? 
Evidence  of looting  abounds.  This  evidence  is mainly  microeconomic 
rather  than macroeconomic  in nature, because both looting and high- 
risk strategies  could be used to milk the S&Ls and leave many institu- 
tions in deep bankruptcy.  To establish  a case for looting, it is necessary 
to show that  loans were made, or assets purchased,  in circumstances  in 
33. That  rate was one-third  after  eleven or twelve years, according  to Asquith,  Mul- 
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which  no reasonable  person  could expect a future  positive payoff in any 
future  state  of the world,  but  for which  the present  payoff  was very high. 
An example of this kind would be the loans made by Oakland-based 
FCA, a rapidly  growing  thrift  that grew to $34 billion  in assets before it 
failed.34  According to one account, FCA followed a strategy of ex- 
tremely  rapid  growth  during  which it was willing  to make loans to any 
developer  willing  to pay 20 percent  interest  plus points, a policy which 
in the S&L  industry  was known  to attract  "lemons,"  projects  headed  for 
almost  certain  default.35  According  to another  account, FCA would  buy 
whatever  mortgage  brokers  in the Southwest wanted to sell, and then 
would  unload  these mortgages  to third  parties,  lending  them the money 
to buy the mortgages  but not forcing  the borrowers  to keep to their  re- 
payment  schedules.36  These policies clearly  correspond  more  closely to 
a bankruptcy-for-profit  strategy  than gambling  for resurrection  as it is 
difficult  to imagine  any state of the world in which bankruptcy  could 
have been avoided. 
The Texas strategy, first apparent  in the examination  of Mesquite, 
Texas-based  Empire Savings and Loan, suggests  just as strongly  that 
negative  yield, rather  than  high  variance,  was the dominant  characteris- 
tic of the asset portfolios  of many thrifts  that later  failed. This strategy 
was followed in many different  forms by different  S&Ls. The first step 
was to make a loan-often  to a developer-for  more than the value of 
the collateral.  Various  complex systems could be worked  out for over- 
valuing  the collateral.  In the case of Empire  Savings and Loan, for ex- 
ample, a group of colluding  developers and thrift owners traded land 
back  and  forth  in a series of trades  at successively higher  prices;  because 
their parcels were sufficiently  similar, these trades could be used for 
price  evaluations  by a friendly  appraiser. 
Once  the development  loan was granted,  the development  itself, as in 
our model, became a source of generous  development  fees. The devel- 
oper  would  pay a high  current  return  on the loan, often made  easier be- 
cause  the loan  included  payments  of interest  for the understandably  long 
time until  the completion  of the project.  As a result, the S&L would re- 
ceive high  current  payments  for some period  of time. Furthermore,  the 
34. Stein  (1992,  p. 206). 
35. See Robinson  (1990, pp. 26-27). This adverse selection problem  corresponds  to 
the reason  for rationing  of loans  given by Stiglitz  and  Weiss (1981). 
36.  Mayer (1990, p. 111) 30  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
developer, whose talents at building  had been appreciated  and sup- 
ported  by the S&L, might  in turn  see what a promising  future  the S&L 
would  have, with its high  current  earnings  and massive growth  rate. So 
the developer and his friends  could purchase  a sizable bloc of stock in 
the S&L  by contributing  overvalued  land  or projects  that  could  be coun- 
ted as part  of the thrift's  capital. The only effective limit  on the returns 
from  this strategy  was the thrift's  ability  to find  new individuals  with  rea- 
sonably  clean criminal  records and balance sheets who were willing  to 
play the role of developer, because regulations  still put a limit on how 
much a thrift  could lend to any one person or firm. Empire  eventually 
offered finder's  fees to anyone who brought  in a new potential  "devel- 
oper." All that was required  was a financial  statement  that was clean 
enough  to pass muster  with the bank  examiners.37 
Table 1 contains a list of thrifts  for which government  investigators 
considered  evidence of fraud  to be the strongest.  Adding  up the resolu- 
tion costs for those for which we could find  cost estimates generates  a 
total  cost to the government  of $54  billion.  This figure  is at best an order 
of magnitude  estimate of the potential  costs from looting. It will be an 
underestimate  because we lack estimates  for some of the thrifts  on our 
list and  because estimated  resolution  costs have typically  been underes- 
timates rather  than  overestimates.  In addition,  there could have been a 
great deal of looting that did not attract  government  attention. On the 
other  hand,  it could  overstate  the losses due to gambling  and  looting, be- 
cause some of the total may simply  represent  losses from  the 1970s  that 
were carried  forward. 
A more  direct  estimate  of the losses due to looting  comes from  a com- 
parison  of the resolution  costs of mutual  savings  banks,  which had  asset 
structures  similar  to that  of savings  and  loans, but  were treated  as banks 
rather  than  thrifts  for historical  and  institutional  reasons. As a result,  the 
savings banks were subject to regulatory  oversight  not by the FSLIC, 
but by the FDIC, which moved aggressively to limit its exposure to 
losses from  these banks  in the early 1980s.38  Banking  authorities  did not 
give the mutuals new powers, liberalize the accounting treatment  of 
their net worth, or encourage  them to grow out of their  difficulties.  In- 
stead, they limited  the mutuals'  activities, and waited the problem  out. 
37. O'Shea(1991,  p31). 
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Table 1.  Resolution Costs at Thrifts Suspected of Fraud 
Present  value in millions  of dollars 
Resolution 
Savings and loan  State  cost 
American  Diversified  Savings  Bank  CA  798 
American  Federal  of Colorado  CO  339 
American  S&L  CA  1,699 
Ameriway  Savings  Assoc.  TX  173 
Bell Savings Bank  PA  189 
Beverly Hills S&L  CA  983 
Bexar Savings  TX  483 
Brookside  Savings  CA  63 
Caguas  Central  FSB  PR  120 
Cal America  CA  100 
Capital  FS&L  AR  23 
Caprock  S&L  TX  299 
Cardinal  Savings Bank  NC  34 
Carver  S&L Association  CA  54 
CenTrust  Bank  FL  1,705 
Century  S&L Association  TX  48 
Charter  Savings  Bank  CA  34 
City Savings  NJ  1,531 
Colonial  Federal  Savings  NJ  119 
Colonial  Savings  Association  KS  37 
Columbia  S&L  CA  1,149 
Commerce  Savings  TX  604 
Commodore  Savings Associationa  TX  1,846 
Commonwealthb  FL  325 
Community  Federal  S&L  MO  372 
Community  S&L  WI  37 
Concordia  Federal  IL  90 
Continental  S&L  TX  678 
Cornerstone  Savings  TX  24 
Creditbanc  Savingsa  TX  1,108 
Cross Roads S&L Association  OK  11 
Deposit Trust Savings  LA  21 
First Atlantic  Savings  NJ  247 
First California  Savings  CA  74 
First Federal  of Shawnee  OK  56 
First Federal  S&L  CA  16 
First Federal  Savings  Bank  WY  11 
First Network Savings  CA  139 
First Savings  Assoc. of East Texas  TX  88 
First Savings Bank and Trust  MO  3 
First State Savings  TX  271 
First S&L of Toledo  OH  128 
First Texas/Gibraltar  Savingsa  TX  5,034 
Franklin  Savings  (Creditbanc)a  TX  ... 
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Table 1.  (continued) 
Present  value in millions  of dollars 
Resolution 
Savings and loan  State  cost 
Freedom  S&L Association  FL  349 
Frontier  Savingsa  OK  279 
General  Savings  Association  TX  18 
Gibraltar  CA  522 
Gold River Savingsb  CA  3 
Great  West Savings  CO  7 
Gulf Federal  LA  176 
Hill Financial  Savings  Association  PA  657 
Home Savings  AK  45 
Imperial  Savings  CA  1,647 
Independence  Federal  AR  291 
Independent  Americana  TX  6,111 
Interwest  Savings  Association 
(Commodore)a  TX  ... 
Lamar  Savings  Associationa  TX  2,115 
Liberty  Federal  NM  80 
Libertyville  Federal  S&L  IL  9 
Lincoln S&L  CA  2,824 
MeraBank  AZ  1,023 
Mercury  Savings  CA  34 
Mercury  Savingsa  TX  1,327 
Meridian  Savings  TX  418 
MeritBanc  Savings  TX  211 
Midwest  Federal  MN  826 
Mission Savings  TX  65 
Multibanc  (Independent  American)a  TX 
Northpark  Savings  (Commodore)  a  TX 
Odessa Savingsa  TX  1,490 
Otero  Savings  CO  257 
Paris S&L Association 
(Mercury)a  TX  ... 
Peoples Bank  for Savings  IL  18 
Peoples Heritage  Federal  Savings  KS  958 
Peoples Homestead  Federal  LA  98 
Peoples Savingsa  TX  343 
Phoenix  Federal  AL  74 
Pima S&L  AZ  319 
Resource Savings  Association  TX  278 
Richardson  Savings  (Mercury)a  TX  ... 
Royal Palm Savings  FL  154 
San Angelo Savings  (Odessa)a  TX 
San Jacinto  Savings  TX  1,424 
Saratoga  Savings  CA  11 
Security  Savings  TX  468 
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Table  1. (continued) 
Present  value in millions  of dollars 
Resolution 
Savings and loan  State  cost 
Stockton  Savings  (Lamar)a  TX  ... 
Sun S&L Association  CO  157 
Sunbelt  Savings  of Texas 
(Independent  American)a  TX 
Territory  S&L Association  OK  46 
TexasBanc  TX  308 
Trinity  Valley  TX  12 
United Savings  Association  of Texas  TX  1,374 
United Savings  NJ  25 
United Savings  VA  112 
United Savings  WY  147 
United Savings  of America  FL  26 
United Savings Bank  MN  31 
Unity Savings  CA  57 
Universal  Savings  TX  223 
University  Federal  Savings  Association  TX  2,557 
Victoria  Savings  TX  782 
Vision Banc  TX  64 
Western  Savings  AZ  1,728 
Western  Savings  (Independent  American)a,b  TX  ... 
Westport  Savings  CA  20 
Williamsburg  Federal  S&L  UT  37 
Total resolution  costs:  53,966 
Source: Names on the list are taken from two main sources: a Resolution  Trust Corporation  (RTC) list of 
prosecutions  already  initiated  or completed,  taken  from  U.S. Senate  (1991);  and  the RTC's  "Top  100"  list of priority 
cases for prosecution,  as leaked  in David  Johnson,  "S&L  Criminal  Inquiries  Confirmed,"  New  York Times, October 
3,  1990, p. D4. We also added two thrifts-United Savings of Texas and Gilbraltar  of California-that  feature 
prominently  in the FDIC  lawsuit  against  Michael  Milken  and Drexel  Burnham  Lambert. 
Estimated  resolution  costs are  taken  from  FSLIC  tables  in U.S. Senate  (1990),  from  the 1990  and 1991  RTC  annual 
reports,  and from  an RTC  Resolved  Conservatorship  Report  of December  1992.  For Cal America,  costs are from 
U.S. House  of Representatives  (1987).  This table  includes  cases of possible  fraud  still  under  consideration  that  were 
current  at the time  that  the source  documents  were  published  (1990  and 1991).  It thus  excludes  a number  of prominent 
cases-Vernon Savings  and  Empire  Savings  in Texas, for example-in which  prosecutions  came  earlier. 
a. Thrifts  sold by FSLIC  as part  of a group  of thrifts.  If a cost is listed,  it is the cost for the entire  group,  not this 
thrift  alone. If a cost is not listed, the name  of the thrift  giving  the cost for the group  appears  in parentheses. 
b. The original  source  note carries  the cryptic  note "unable  to make  specific  identification." 
In 1982,  the savings  banks  had assets that were 25 percent  of the assets 
at savings  and loans.39  From 1981  to 1986,  the FDIC spent about  $7 bil- 
lion to rescue and recapitalize  ailing  savings banks.40  If this experience 
is any guide, the entire thrift  crisis could have been solved at a cost of 
about  $28 billion  by following  a strategy  parallel  to the one adopted  by 
39.  Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1984, p. A26. 
40. Based  on personal  communication  with  G. K. Gibbs. 34  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
the FDIC  of limiting  the activities  of insolvent  institutions  and  resolving 
them over time as reductions in interest rates increased the value of 
mortgage  assets. 
Another way to construct an estimate of the losses caused by the 
combination  of the regulatory  treatment  given to thrifts  and  the perverse 
incentives  that  this created  for owners  is to compare  the resolution  costs 
at stockholder-owned  S&Ls with the costs at mutual  S&Ls, where the 
depositors  were the legal owners. Because the true  owners  of the mutu- 
als were more dispersed and faced greater  difficulty  in controlling  the 
behavior  of management  and  in capturing  the gains  from  looting  or gam- 
bling  in the form  of direct  payouts, management  at the mutuals  had  much 
less incentive  to pursue  strategies  that  gave shareholders  a current  gain 
but  that  risked  theirjobs. Consistent  with this theory, Benjamin  C. Esty 
has found  that  stock thrifts  failed  at three  times the rate  (26.8  percent)  as 
mutual  thrifts  (8.1 percent)  between 1983  and 1988.4' 
A comparison  of the costs at mutual  thrifts  and stock thrifts  similarly 
suggests that the costs of resolving  the thrift  crisis could have been in 
the range  of $20-$30 billion.  In 1982,  mutual  S&Ls had  about  two times 
as many  assets as stock S&Ls. If there  had  been no incentive  to loot, the 
behavior  of the two types of thrifts  should  have been the same and the 
costs of resolving  the stock thrifts  should  have been about  half the cost 
of resolving  problems  at the mutuals.  But  in fact, the incentives  faced by 
managers  in the two different  kinds of institutions  were quite different; 
their  behavior  reflects  this difference.  While  the total quantity  of assets 
held by the mutuals  stayed almost  constant  from 1982  to 1987,  assets at 
the stock thrifts grew more than four-fold.42  Because losses were in- 
curred  on many  of the investments  made  by the stock thrifts  during  this 
period  of growth,  a small  problem  at the stock S&Ls grew  into a very big 
problem. 
To estimate  what the resolution  costs for the S&Ls would have been 
if thrift  regulators  had followed the conservative  strategy  of the FDIC, 
we calculated  what total resolution  costs would have been if all thrifts 
had behaved  like the mutuals  after 1982.  We used the Treasury  bill rate 
to convert  costs incurred  in different  years  into  a common  unit, 1982  dol- 
lars. (Because the thrifts  typically  had to pay a premium  over the Trea- 
41. Esty (1992,  table 1, panel  B). 
42. See Barth  (1991,  table  3-8, p. 57). George A. Akerlof and Paull M. Romer  35 
sury  bill rate  to attract  brokered  deposits, the use of this rate makes  our 
estimate of the cost slightly larger  than if we used their actual cost of 
funds. In this sense, our use of the Treasury  bill rate  is conservative.)  If 
we apply  the resulting  estimate  of the cost per dollar  of assets at the mu- 
tuals  to all assets in the S&L industry,  we find  that  the total  cost of reso- 
lution  would  have been $26.8  billion  in 1982  dollars.43 
Four  remarks  should  be made  about  this calculation.  First, resolving 
the problem  earlier  makes the current  dollar  cost smaller  because the 
resolution  cost will grow  with  the interest  rate.  If we use the three-month 
Treasury  bill rate to bring  a $26.8 billion cost in 1982  forward  to 1993, 
the costs would  be slightly  less than  $60  billion,  or (2.15 x $26.8  billion). 
This  number  can be compared  to an actual  cost (that  has been converted 
into 1993  dollars)  of $140  billion. 
Second, the $26.8 billion  total cost of resolving  problems  in the thrift 
industry  includes  looting  and  excessive risk-taking  at mutuals.  To make 
a rough  adjustment  for this, we calculated  the fraction  of losses of mutu- 
als from  the list of suspect thrifts  in table 1. Mutuals  accounted  for 8 per- 
cent of the costs in this group. Stock thrifts  accounted  for the other 92 
percent. Using this percentage to calculate an estimate of avoidable 
losses from 1982  to 1993  at the mutuals  reduces our estimate  of the cost 
by about  $4 billion  in 1982  dollars. 
Third, the estimate assumes that mutuals that were converted to 
stock  ownership  during  this  period  and  that  were resolved  later  had  non- 
negative  net worth  at the time when they were converted.  We think  that 
this is a reasonable  assumption.  In a conversion,  existing  depositors  are 
offered  the opportunity  to purchase  shares  in the new stock thrift.  A dis- 
persed  group  of investors  who do not expect to be able to loot would  not 
pay to invest in a thrift  that had a negative net worth. Moreover, the 
bank  board,  which  had to approve  all conversions, required  that  the net 
worth  of the institution  be positive and that the price for the shares in 
the new institution  be fair.  These rules, together  with restrictions  on the 
amount  of equity  that  could  be acquired  by insiders,  would  have made  it 
inconvenient  to convert a mutual  with a large  negative  net worth  into a 
stock thrift  with the intention  of gaining  control  and  looting  it. 
43. The  assets  and  resolution  costs of the mutual  and  stock  S&Ls  are  taken  from  Barth 
(1991)  and  our  calculations  of resolution  costs for 1990  and 1991  from  annual  reports  of the 
Resolution  Trust  Corporation.  We  are  grateful  to James  Barth  for  providing  updated  tables 
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Fourth, we truncated  the resolution  costs in 1991,  the last year for 
which data are available. Using the Treasury  bill rate to convert costs 
incurred  in different  years into costs in 1993,  the total resolution  costs 
incurred  in the years for which we have data are $140  billion, which is 
close to the total estimated  costs for the bailout  of about $150-$175  bil- 
lion reported  by the National Commission  on Financial  Institution  Re- 
form,  Recovery, and  Enforcement."4  Thus  we expect that  our  data  cover 
the bulk of total costs that the government  will incur. In any case, the 
comparison  of the approximately  $60  billion  in 1993  costs for thrifts  cov- 
ered in our data versus $140  billion  in actual  costs is valid. Because the 
costs at the mutuals  tended  to be resolved earlier  than  costs at the stock 
thrifts,  we expect the final  totals will primarily  reflect  additional  costs at 
stock thrifts  rather  than additional  costs at the mutuals.  If so, the final 
tally for the costs of letting  the stock thrifts  behave as they did will be 
even higher  than  our  calculations  suggest. 
Boom and Bust in Dallas 
We described earlier  how S&Ls could be looted in symbiotic deals 
with parasitical  developers who would also go bankrupt.  This section 
develops a model  of this activity  and shows how a small  amount  of such 
looting  by S&Ls  can  be the impulse-through a multiplier-that induces 
a bubble  in building  activity and land  prices. This bubble  will be fueled 
by honest developers  who fail to understand  the source  of the additional 
demand  caused  by looters  and  parasites.  We call these developers  copy- 
cats because they infer  the implicit  rents  from  building  by watching  the 
market  price for land; they are thus analogous  to the investors in the 
stock market  who do not collect fundamental  information,  but merely 
purchase  the market  portfolio.45  Unfortunately  for the copycat devel- 
opers, when the demand  for land expands  because of looting, they fail 
to understand  the source of the rise in price. The copycats act on the 
principle  that if a crowd is staring  at the sky, they too should  look, be- 
44. National  Commission  on Financial  Institution  Reform,  Recovery, and Enforce- 
ment  (1993,  p. 4). 
45. For  recent  models  in which  agents  infer  the value  of important  signals  by watching 
others, see Banerjee  (1993), Bikchandani,  Hirshleifer,  and Welch (1992), Caplin  and 
Leahy  (1991),  and  Romer  (1993). George A. Akerlof and Paul M. Romer'  37 
cause there must  be something  to see-  otherwise  the crowd would not 
be staring  so intently.  Most of the time this behavior  is correct. When  it 
is wrong,  it eventually  comes to an abrupt  halt. 
The Model 
We start  with a simple  model of land  prices, and initially,  no looters. 
There are two types of developers. The first, who comprise  a fraction 
(1 -  I) of the market,  have a demand  that  depends  only on a shift  param- 
eter, A, and  on the price  for land,  p. Their  demand,  D1, is 
(7)  DI  =  (I  -  O)(A -  bp). 
The shift parameter,  A, reflects fundamentals  such as the number  of 
people moving  into the city or region,  the expected incomes of the resi- 
dents, and other exogenous factors. This first  type of developer  knows 
the value of A  . 
Developers of the second type, who together  form  a fraction  I of the 
market,  do not know the true value of A, but estimate it from signals 
inferred  from  the activities  of others. Their  demand,  D2, is similar  to the 
demand  by type 1 developers, but their  estimate of the shift parameter 
is Ae: 
(8)  D2  =  3(Ae -bp). 
In our simple  model, parallel  to Grossman's  fully revealing  rational  ex- 
pectations  model, we assume  that these type 2 developers  infer  the true 
value of A from the market  price for land.46  In other words, Ae is esti- 
mated  from  an equation  of the form 
(9)  Ae  =  8 +  'yp. 
We assume that  this estimate  of Ae  is rational,  so the parameters  8 and y 
in this expression must be chosen so that this yields an unbiased  esti- 
mate  for  A. 
The supply  of land to developers, S, which is generated  outside the 
model, is upward-sloping,  of the form 
(10)  S = d + ep, 
where  p is the price  and  d and  e are parameters. 
46. Grossman  (1976). 38  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1993 
Equating  supply with demand  in this land market  yields an equilib- 
rium  price  for land  that  is a function  of the parameters  in the expression 
for A . Matching  coefficients so that  Ae is equal to A implies  that 8  =  d 
and y = b +  e. With  these values substituted  in, the demand  for land  by 
copycat investors  can be written  as 
(11)  D2=(d  +  ep). 
The copycats' reduced-form  demand  is increasing  in price  because  price 
increases signal increases in market  fundamentals.  Moreover,  in equi- 
librium,  they purchase  a fraction  c of all the land  that  is sold  for develop- 
ment. That is, they exactly replicate the behavior of the market  as a 
whole,  just as index investors  buy their  share  of the stock market. 
This supply  and demand  system describes a very simple  rational  ex- 
pectations  equilibrium.  Now consider  a new equilibrium  with a change 
in regulations,  so that  looters at S&Ls will offer  new loans in the amount 
N to parasitical  developers  who are  new entrants  and  who have no inter- 
est in making  a profit. Initially,  before agents adjust  the parameters  in 
their  expectations  function,  how will the equilibrium  price  change?  Who 
will gain  and  who will lose? And by how much? 
To simplify  the model, we assume  that  the parasitical  developers  take 
out loans only for building,  and  that  one parcel  of land  requires  B dollars 
of building.  The direct  effect of the looting  is an increase  in the demand 
for land  by an amount  D3 =  NIB. The new equilibrium  equates  the new 
total  demand  D1 + D2 + D3 to the supply  S. The looters  at the S&Ls and 
the parasitical  developers  have every reason  to conceal their  true  intent, 
so we assume that the honest but uninformed  developers  do not recog- 
nize the parasites  as new entrants  into this market;  these honest devel- 
opers therefore  continue  to use the same rule as before to infer  the fun- 
damentals  from the market  price. The informed  developers, of course, 
continue to observe the true value of A. This combination  of circum- 
stances will lead directly  to a real estate boom and bust. We shall now 
describe  the new equilibrium  (and  its collapse). 
To the copycat developers, it appears  that the fundamental  shift pa- 
rameter  A has increased  by the amount 
(12)  [1/(1 -  1)](NIB). 
The price of land  increases  by 
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The quantity  of land  that is developed  increases  by the slope coefficient 
e (from  the supply  equation)  times this price change. Note that  these in- 
creases vary inversely with the fraction of fundamental  developers, 
1 -  P. If the fundamental  developers comprise only 10 percent of the 
market,  the effect of the new demand  stemming  from  the symbiotic  rela- 
tionship  between  looters and  parasites  is ten times what  it would  be if all 
developers  were fully informed. 
In the new equilibrium,  the fundamental  investors  withdraw  from  the 
market.  Given the price increase they observe and the unchanged  esti- 
mate  of the market  fundamentals,  they reduce  their  purchases  of land  by 
(1 -  1)b times the price increase. The copycat investors increase  their 
purchases  of land  by an amount  equal  to Pe times the price  increase. 
Now suppose that the true value of A is revealed (through  persist- 
ently high vacancy rates, for example); that the parasitical  develop- 
ments  are  taken  over by regulators  and  sold on the open market;  and  that 
savings and loans are prohibited  from engaging  in this kind of looting. 
Because building  is irreversible,  the price of developed real estate falls 
below the level before the looters began to finance development. The 
parasitical  developers  go bankrupt,  as expected. In addition,  however, 
so do some of the fundamental  and copycat investors, who take capital 
losses because of the unexpected  price  decline. In an extended  model  of 
a growing  economy, the normal  pace of construction  activity would be 
interrupted  for several  years, with no new building  taking  place until  the 
local demand  had increased  to meet the excess supply. 
The Evidence 
Our  model  and  the sequence  of events it portrays  describes  the build- 
ing boom of the 1980s in Dallas, the center of activity for the Texas 
thrifts.  The comparison  with Houston is illuminating.  For both cities, 
table  2 reports  construction  activity and vacancy rates for office space. 
The construction  peaks occurred  earlier  in Houston than  in Dallas/Fort 
Worth,  with  office  construction  peaking  in 1983  in Houston,  but  not until 
1985  in Dallas/Fort  Worth.  The timing  of these peaks can be explained 
partly  by the differences  in the economies of the two cities. Houston's 
economy is oil-based,  while Dallas/Fort  Worth's  is much  more diversi- 
fied. For example,  in Houston  45 percent  of office space is occupied by 40  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  2:1993 
Table 2.  Office Construction and Vacancy Rates for Dallas/Fort Worth and Houston, 
1981-90 
Dallas/Forth  Worth  Houston 
Year  Constructiona  Vacanciesb  Constructiona  Vacanciesb 
1981  7,739  8  17,193  6 
1982  14,750  11  22,490  8 
1983  14,928  20  29,230  20 
1984  10,843  19  10,900  24 
1985c  20,000  23  3,500  24 
1986  14,090  32  4,301  32 
1987  7,290  32  626  29 
1988  2,328  32  756  26 
1989  1,807  27  543  24 
1990  831  24  837  21 
Source: Urban  Land  Institute  (1986, 1990,  and 1991). 
a. Thousands  of square  feet. 
b. Percent  of total. 
c.  Figures  for 1985  are estimates. 
energy-related  firms,  compared  to 10.5  percent in Dallas/Fort  Worth.47 
The near-coincidence  of the rise and fall in oil prices and construction 
suggests that oil price changes were the likely cause for the boom and 
bust in Houston  nonresidential  and  residential  construction. 
But while the difference  in economies may explain  why Dallas/Fort 
Worth  peaked later than Houston, it does not explain why significant 
new construction  continued in Dallas/Fort  Worth even after high va- 
cancy rates had set in.48  By 1983,  the office vacancy rate  in Dallas/Fort 
Worth  had already  reached  20 percent, a rate that equaled  Houston's. 
Indeed,  from 1986-90,  Dallas/Fort  Worth  vacancy  rates  were at least as 
high  as those in Houston. Yet significant  amounts  of building  continued 
until 1988. 
The excess of S&L  lending  is very clear  from  a comparison  with bank 
lending.  Between 1982  and 1986,  the assets of Texas commercial  banks 
grew by 27 percent;  by contrast,  the assets at the Texas S&Ls grew by 
47.  Steve Brown, "City Review: Dallas," National  Real Estate Investor News,  Octo- 
ber 1986,  p. 180. 
48. Changes  in the deductibility  of real estate losses in the Tax Reform  Act of 1986 
could  possibly  explain  the end of the office  building  boom. Our  problem,  however,  is not 
to explain  why  the boom  ended,  but  rather  why  with  vacancy  rates  in excess of 20 percent, 
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99  percent,  and  those of the notorious  "Texas  40"  S&Ls  grew  by 299  per- 
cent,49  while real  estate loans grew almost  as fast as total assets. 
The after-effects  of the building  spree are certainly  consistent with 
our model's prediction of widespread bankruptcy  after the collapse, 
even for banks and developers who were not party  to looting. In 1987, 
when the resolution  of the crisis was beginning,  S&Ls in Texas had a 
very high delinquency  rate of 29 percent oii real estate loans, which is 
unsurprising  given the behavior described in our model. But even at 
Texas banks-which were more  tightly  regulated- 13  percent  of the real 
estate  loans  were nonperforming,  a level that  had  not been reached  since 
the Great  Depression.50 
Our  hypothesis  is that  many  real  estate loans were made  by the thrifts 
without serious regard  as to whether  they would default. It appears  to 
be conventional  wisdom among  bankers  that loans with high rates are 
very  likely  to default,  as illustrated  by the case of FCA  discussed  earlier. 
Among  Texas thrifts,  those that  later  failed  had  average  mortgage  inter- 
est rates 76 basis points higher  than  the mortgage  rates of thrifts  that  re- 
mained  solvent. Moreover, the S&Ls that grew particularly  fast were 
particularly  likely to have high mortgage  lending rates. Of the Texas 
S&Ls that  ultimately  became  insolvent, the thirty-five  that  grew  at rates 
of more  than  50 percent  per year between 1980  and 1984  had an average 
lending  rate 148  basis points in excess of the S&Ls that remained  sol- 
vent.5'  The higher  rates  were only one of the methods  used  to loot S&Ls. 
As noted above, fee income, for which it is more  difficult  to gather  data, 
was apparently  even more  important. 
The tale we have told can  be traced  through  the city reports  on Dallas 
in the National  Real Estate Investor News  (NREIN).  As early as June 
1982,  developers  who seem to correspond  to the informed  developers  in 
our model realized  that something  was going on and openly expressed 
their  concern. For example, in a NREIN story subtitled  "Experts  Con- 
cerned About Huge Supply Pipeline,"  Mark  Pogue of Dallas' Lincoln 
Properties said, "All of us need to be more cautious....  How will this 
market  absorb these millions of square feet?"52  A year later, in June 
49. U.S. House of Representatives  (1990,  p. 213). 
50. Short  and  Gunther  (1988,  table  4, p. 5). 
51. Short  and  Gunther  (1988,  table  3, p. 3) and  personal  communication. 
52. Steven Brown, "Office  Market  Outlook:  Dallas,"  National Real Estate Investor 
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1983, Dallas ranked second nationally to Houston in vacant office 
space.53  At the same time, paradoxically,  it was first  in office construc- 
tion. In October 1983, McDonald  Williams  of Trammell  Crow, one of 
the county's most successful and respected developers, warned  about 
the overbuilding  and  put  the blame  to a considerable  extent on "the  push 
that savings and loans are making into commercial real estate .  .  ..  They 
are going to keep us overbuilt, I think."54  He also blamed  institutional 
investment  funds, which  correspond  to the copycat suppliers  of funds  in 
our model. A year later, with the NREIN reporting  that "old timers  in 
Dallas [were] amazed at the surge in construction,"55  Dan Arnold of 
Swearingen  Company  provided  his explanation  of the continued  activ- 
ity:  "Financial institutions and lenders have money that must be 
placed."56  Still later, in June of 1985  Wayne Swearingen  could not ex- 
plain  why the rising  vacancies had not led to a slowdown  in office con- 
struction.  "We  have developers sitting  there with empty buildings,  and 
the lenders  are giving  them money to start  another  one. I have to blame 
the lenders. I want them to show me where these builders  are going to 
get cash flow....  The laws of supply and demand are not governing 
market  behavior. Continuing  construction  in the face of high vacancy 
seems related to the availability  of financing  for new buildings,  rather 
than need."57 
He was speaking  just before  the crash  removed  any doubt  that there 
was a problem. Our model suggests that he had the diagnosis exactly 
right. 
Looting, Junk Bonds, and Takeovers 
This  now leads  us to our  final  question.  An even more  dramatic  devel- 
opment in North America  during  the 1980s  than the boom and bust in 
53.  Steve  Brown, "City Review:  Dallas," National  Real Estate Investor News,  June 
1983,  p. 60. 
54.  Steve Brown, "City Review: Dallas," National  Real Estate Investor News,  Octo- 
ber 1983,  p. 127. 
55.  Steve Brown, "City Review: Dallas," National  Real Estate Investor News,  Octo- 
ber 1984,  p. 183. 
56.  Steve Brown, "City Review: Dallas," National  Real Estate Investor News,  Octo- 
ber 1984,  p. 192. 
57.  Steve  Brown, "City Review:  Dallas," National  Real Estate Investor News,  June 
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real  estate was the rise and  decline  ofjunk bonds and  debt-financed  cor- 
porate  takeovers.  Is there  a link  between  bankruptcy  for profit  in S&Ls, 
junk bonds, and  takeovers? 
At first  glance, such a link appears  implausible  because the value of 
junk bonds held by S&Ls was small compared  to the total  junk bond 
market, and very small compared  to the total quantity  of assets that 
changed  hands.  Even at the peak, S&Ls held only about  $13.2  billion  of 
junk bonds,58  whereas the total outstanding  issues of junk bonds ex- 
ceeded $200  billion  by 1989.59  During  the entire  decade of the 1980s,  the 
total  value  of assets changing  hands  in takeovers  was $1.3  trillion.60  How 
could a relatively  small amount  of junk bond purchases  by thrifts  have 
had any significant  effect on the  junk bond market  as a whole, and indi- 
rectly on the volume  of takeovers? 
In this section, we suggest that a particular  form of S&L looting in- 
deed influenced  the timing and volume of takeover transactions.  The 
first  part  of this argument  rests on the assertion,  articulated  for example 
by Michael  C. Jensen, that the creation  of the  junk bond  market  did en- 
courage  the takeover  wave of the 1980s.6' The ability  demonstrated  by 
Drexel  Burnham  Lambert  in the 1980s  to raise  billions  of dollars  in only a 
few days lent credibility  to takeover  bids  for  large  firms  that  never  before 
could have been financed.  Even though  junk bonds provided  only part 
of the ultimate  financing  for the totality  of takeover  transactions,  "high- 
yield bonds are an important  innovation  in the takeover field because 
they help eliminate size as a deterrent to takeover," as Jensen has 
argued.62 
The second part  of our argument  is that the funds made  available  by 
the owners of S&Ls who were interested  in looting made  it possible to 
reduce artificially the  interest rate on junk debt underwritten  by 
Drexel.63  Potential  purchasers  of Drexel  debt  could  observe two key sig- 
58. See Yago  (1991,  p. 187). 
59.  Investor's Digest Daily,  as cited in Yago (1991, p. 199). 
60. Andrei  Shleifer  and  Robert  W. Vishny,  "The  Takover  Wave  of the 1980s,"  Science 
249,  August  17, 1990,  p. 745. 
61. Jensen  (1988). 
62. Jensen  (1988,  p. 39). 
63. As far  as we know, Benjamin  Stein was the first  person  to emphasize  the impor- 
tance  of the links  between  the savings  and  loans  and  the  junk  bond  market.  His argument 
first  appeared  in a series  of articles  published  in  Barron's  in the late 1980s.  For  a summary 
of his case, see Stein  (1992). 44  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1993 
nals concerning  the quality  of its offerings:  the success rate  of its under- 
writings  and  the default  rate on its outstanding  issues. Our  claim  is that 
relatively  small  amounts  of other people's money could be used to ma- 
nipulate  these two signals  and thereby  cause Drexel borrowers  to pay a 
lower interest  rate  than  they otherwise  would  have had  to pay. 
We  will show that  unusual  circumstances  provided  an  opportunity  for 
successful  manipulation  of the  junk  bond  market.  We will also show that 
there  were many  tell-tale signs consistent with the actual  occurrence  of 
such market  manipulation.  Before turning  to the details in this argu- 
ment, we place it in the context of the popular  and scholarly  literature 
on takeovers. 
Our  story  of looting  and  takeovers  has nothing  to do with  the  journal- 
istic accounts  of a takeover  artist  who acquires  control  of a firm  and  then 
"loots"  it. Victor  Posner  is the person  most frequently  cited as an exam- 
ple of this type of corporate  looter, with  a personal  take  from  companies 
under  his control  reportedly  in excess of $23 million  in 1984.*4 
The vast bulk of takeover  activity cannot be explained  in this naive 
fashion. Detailed accounts of transactions such as the RJR-Nabisco 
takeover  give ample  evidence of serious attention  to the true economic 
returns  of the deal under consideration.65  Furthermore,  too many so- 
phisticated  investors invested in takeovers  and had no access to fee in- 
come or excessive compensation.66 
A theory  of the takeover  wave must  therefore  be consistent  with seri- 
ous attempts  at value-maximization  by the investors in takeovers. As 
noted  above, our  claim  is that  looting  strategies  followed  by S&Ls could 
have led to reduced yields paid on junk bonds, which made debt-fi- 
nanced  takeovers  more  attractive  to rational  investors. 
Market Manipulation 
Under normal  circumstances,  large markets  cannot be manipulated 
for profit  by small  groups  of individuals.  Historically,  attempts  to domi- 
64. Stewart  (1992,  p. 121). 
65. See Burrough  and  Helyar  (1990,  pp. 363-66). 
66. For a discussion  of the underlying  fundamentals  that  help explain  why takeovers 
were attractive,  and why many  corporations  needed restructuring  during  the 1980s,  see 
Jensen  (1988),  Scherer  (1988),  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1988),  and  Andrei  Shleifer  and  Robert 
W. Vishny,  "The  Takeover  Wave  of the 1980s,"  Science  249,  August  17, 1990,  pp. 745-49. George  A. Akerlof  and Pauil  M. Rome}  45 
nate the U.S. grain,  gold, and silver markets  have borne  out this insight 
of economic  theory. They have led to the downfall,  rather  than  the mak- 
ing, of ambitious  speculators.  In this section, we argue  that conditions 
in the  junk  bond  market  of the 1980s  were not normal.  Both  the structure 
of information  and  the availability  of other  people's money-that is, tax- 
payers' money controlled by the looters of financial  institutions-of- 
fered unique opportunities  for profitable  manipulation  of a large-scale 
market.  We wish to show that  the evidence is sufficient  to give the case 
for market  manipulation  its day in court. 
The  junk bond market  of the 1980s  was not a thick, anonymous  auc- 
tion market  characterized  by full revelation  of information.  To a very 
great extent, the market  owed its existence to a single individual,  Mi- 
chael Milken, who acted, literally,  as the auctioneer.  Milken  created a 
new securities  market  that lent funds to firms  that had previously  been 
able to borrow  only from  banks.  The market  for new issue bonds below 
investment  grade  was trivially  small prior  to the 1980s  presumably  be- 
cause of the inherent difficulty  in controlling  opportunistic  behavior 
when  a limited  liability  corporation  borrows  money. As we noted  above, 
private lenders face the same difficulties  as the government  faces in 
lending  to an entity  that  can declare  bankruptcy;  borrowers  can take the 
money and run. We also noted that economists presume  that opportu- 
nistic behavior has somehow been controlled in cases where private 
lending  does take place. An obvious corollary  is that opportunistic  be- 
havior  has not been controlled  in cases where  apparently  profitable  lend- 
ing does not take place. The absence of a large-scale  market  in securi- 
tized risky debt prior to the 1980s presumably  reflects an inability  to 
resolve these problems  through  any  institutional  arrangement  other  than 
bank  lending,  in which  the lender  and  the individual  engaged  in monitor- 
ing the borrower  are part  of a single  organization. 
Milken as Loan Broker 
The claim  that  Milken  made  in the 1980s  was, in effect, that  he could 
play the role of both filter  and monitor  in a securities  market  for risky 
debt. He would identify  creditworthy  borrowers  who were willing  and 
able to pay very high yields and he would verify that they did as they 
promised  with the proceeds. (In this second connection, it is puzzling 
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restrictions than conventional corporate debt,67  so Milken's control 
over these firms  would  presumably  have operated  through  other  mecha- 
nisms.) 
To take  advantage  of his putative  strengths  in evaluating  and  monitor- 
ing borrowers,  Milken  could have had Drexel take the role of a bank, 
holding  the high-yield  debt from these firms  and earning  a spread  over 
Drexel's  borrowing  costs. But instead  of operating  like a banker,  Milken 
earned  income for himself  and for Drexel by charging  a commission  on 
all the loans that he arranged  between the borrowers  and a diverse set 
of lenders  and, allegedly, sharing  in the gains from the takeovers  made 
possible by this debt. 
In creating  this new market  for securitized  bank  loans, Milken  faced 
a serious credibility  problem.  Loan brokers,  who match  borrowers  and 
lenders in exchange for a commission, have a deservedly bad reputa- 
tion. The incentive  to match  bad  credits  with  gullible  lenders  and  to walk 
away with the initial  fees is very high. It can also take several years for 
this kind of scheme to be detected because even a bad creditor  can set 
aside some of the initial  proceeds  from  a loan to make  several  coupon  or 
interest payments. Proponents of junk bonds as  "securitized bank 
loans"  therefore  have to argue  not only that Milken  had  unique  abilities 
in evaluating  credit risk and making  judgments about borrowers, but 
also that  he was somehow  able to establish  a reputation  for competence 
and  reliability  with the investors  who bought  his issues. 
In retrospect,  it is not easy to make  the case that  Milken  succeeded  in 
establishing  his credibility  as a loan broker  because of an exceptional 
ability in making  judgments  about his borrowers.  Even at the time, it 
was clear that Milken made many questionable  judgments  about bor- 
rowers, his initial support  and continued  backing  of Posner being  just 
one particularly  salient  example. 
The most likely explanation  for investors'  faith  in Milken  was demon- 
strated  success. Until 1987,  when the threat  of prosecution  became  a se- 
rious concern, Milken  had demonstrated  two remarkable  kinds of suc- 
cess. The default  rate  on his  junk bonds had  been very low compared  to 
the premium  over investment  grade  bonds, and the success rate of his 
underwritings  had been very high. Given the private  nature  of the  junk 
bond market, these were the only observable signals that an investor 
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could use tojudge Milken's performance, and by these measures, he had 
done  extremely  well.  William Seidman recalls  his perceptions  at the 
time: 
A phenomenon  that  mystified  me when I was dean  of the Arizona  State Univer- 
sity Business School was: How did Drexel Burnham  Lambert  and  its star  part- 
ner Michael  Milken  roll up an unparalleled  record of successes in selling  junk 
bonds? As far as we could determine,  his underwritings  never failed and ap- 
peared  to be marketed  successfully,  no matter  how suspect  the company  or how 
risky the buyout deal that was being financed. Other  investment  houses had 
some failed  junk bond offerings,  but Drexel's record  was near  perfect. We di- 
rected  our  faculty  to research  the matter.. . . The  faculty  came  up  with  no plaus- 
ible  explanation;  like so many  others  they fell back  on the thesis  of the  junk  bond 
king's  unique  genius.68 
If we view Milken as someone who invested in a reputation for deliv- 
ering good returns to purchasers of his debt, it is clear that an unblem- 
ished record of delivering on his promises was essential  to maintaining 
this reputational equilibrium. We suggest  that Milken may have been 
able to sustain such a record of successful underwritings and low default 
rates by manipulating the market. 
Purchases  by Partnerships 
The complaint brought by the FDIC against Milken and his associates 
gives  an explanation  of  the  near-perfect  record  of  underwriting suc- 
cesses.69 According to the complaint, Milken formed more than 500 dif- 
ferent partnerships that purchased securities in public offerings under- 
written by his employer.  The complaint reports that in the first half of 
1988, the partnerships and Drexel insiders made more than 14,000 pur- 
chases  through 6,000 different accounts  from Drexel  public offerings. 
These purchases could serve several purposes.  They could ensure that 
all public offerings were fully subscribed.  They  could also be used to 
mark up prices on bonds or strip the equity kicker from a bond before 
it was sold to the public, thereby hiding from both the issuers  and the 
purchasers the true profits of Drexel and Milken on any deal. Participa- 
tion in a partnership that was guaranteed to make a profit could also be 
used as an inducement for managers at mutual funds and savings and 
68. Seidman  (1993,  p. 235). 
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loans to buy overvalued  or unusually  risky  junk debt for their institu- 
tions. 
Jesse Kornbluth  reports  the details  of one transaction  that  illustrates 
one way in which large  profits  could be extracted  through  the partner- 
ships.70  When Kohlberg  Kravis Roberts (KKR) engaged  in its bidding 
war for Storer Communications,  the partnership  relied on assurances 
that  Drexel  could  finance  the deal. For  KKR  to beat  its rival,  Milken  was 
ultimately  forced  to raise  $1.466  billion  in two days to finance  a purchase 
that  many  professionals  thought  was too expensive.71 This was also the 
first  time that Milken  had needed to raise sums this large  on such short 
notice. Milken  told KKR that it would  have to bundle  "equity  sweeten- 
ers -warrants-with  the debt  to be able  to finance  the deal. Milken  had 
Drexel sell the bundled  debt and warrants  to various  partnerships  that 
he controlled.  These partnerships  kept  the warrants,  but  sold the debt  to 
outsiders. The warrants  on this deal generated about $172 million in 
profit. Milken-controlled  partnerships  secretly kept more than 80 per- 
cent of these warrants.72 
It is dubious  that secret purchases  paid by Milken  would have been 
sufficient  to manipulate  the  junk bond  market  profitably.  Someone who 
wanted  to engage  in market  manipulation  would  ideally  like to have ac- 
cess to large  captive pools of financial  assets. These assets would pro- 
vide back-up  funds sufficient  to ensure  that any new issue could be ab- 
sorbed and moved rapidly from partnership accounts to  outside 
accounts. Furthermore,  these captive  pools could be used to reduce  the 
observed default  rate by having  them provide new long-term  financing 
to companies  that were truly  bankrupt.  Outstanding  bonds could have 
been exchanged  for new bonds held by the pools of the captive institu- 
tions. Or these companies  could have been infused  with new capital  by 
ajunk bond  issue. 
It is this possibility-that  looters at savings and loans helped defer 
default and reduce observed default rates-that  we consider next. 
Bribes to managers  of mutual  funds could be used to achieve the same 
effect, but we will focus on savings  and loans because of our interest  in 
the economywide  effects of the incentives  for looting  created  by govern- 
ment  guarantees. 
70. Kornbluth  (1992). 
71. See Bruck  (1989,  p. 176). 
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The Potential  Profits from Broker Manipulation 
Under  normal  circumstances,  it would not pay a securities  broker  to 
use his or her own resources  to change  default  rates  in order  to increase 
the demand  for his product.  The costs of the manipulation  would nor- 
mally  overwhelm  any recapture  through  increases in the broker's  com- 
missions. However, the late 1980s  provided  unique  opportunities.  The 
availability  of S&Ls  to be looted made  the  junk  bond  market  ripe  for ma- 
nipulation. 
A comparison  of the prospective  benefits  to buyers  of bonds and the 
prospective  increases  in commissions  to bond  brokers  shows that  a bro- 
ker cannot  normally  increase  his or her profits  by purchasing  at par  any 
bonds that are about to go into default and absorbing  the losses. This 
absorption  would  increase  the demand  for bonds, which  would  increase 
the broker's commissions, but almost invariably  by less than the refi- 
nance  cost to reduce  the default  rate  on previously  issued bonds. 
The argument  goes as follows. The expected benefit  to buyers  of cur- 
rently issued bonds from the manipulation  of default rates is the ex- 
pected reduction  in future  losses. In a steady state, with constant new 
issues of bonds, the payments  made  on previously  issued bonds will ex- 
actly  correspond  to the reduction  in expected  future  losses on bonds  that 
are currently  issued, if buyers' expectations  of future  default  losses are 
formed  by the historical  experience  of past  default  losses. Because these 
expected reductions  in losses are in the future  but the payments  by the 
broker-manipulator  are in the present,  the buyers'  discounted  expected 
gains  will be less than  the cost to the manipulator  of changing  the histori- 
cal default  rates. Only  if the number  of bonds  issued in the past  is consid- 
erably  less than  the volume of current  issues will the buyers' increased 
valuation  of the bonds exceed the brokers'  costs. The broker-manipula- 
tor also faces a problem  in that  he will typically  be able to capture  only 
a small  fraction  of the increase  in the market  value  that  his expenditures 
create. 
If buyers  extrapolate  the artificially  low rates  of default,  faster  growth 
of the market  reduces the costs of manipulation  relative  to buyers' ex- 
pected gains because it reduces the number  of previously  issued bonds 
whose losses must  be absorbed  relative  to currently  issued bonds. If the 
total quantity  of bonds outstanding  grows at the rate of interest on the 
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current  default  rates, the increase in the market  value of the newly is- 
sued bonds  induced  by the manipulation  will  just equal  the broker's  cost 
of absorbing  default  losses. If the market  grows faster than the rate of 
interest,  the expected  gains  in the value  of the new bonds  will exceed the 
expected costs to the broker. 
Many different circumstances made the junk bond market of the 
1980s  uniquely  manipulable.  Drexel and the Milken  partnerships  were 
able to capture a significant  share of the wedge between the demand 
curve and supply curve for junk bonds, as earlier illustrated  by the 
Storer  deal. Milken  and  Drexel were not  just charging  a routine  commis- 
sion. In many  cases, they were able  take  advantage  of an  unusually  large 
bid-ask  spread  and  to adjust  it to extract  the maximum  possible amount. 
Accordingly,  they could have captured  an unusually  large share of the 
increased  value of the newly issued bonds that would  be caused by ma- 
nipulation  of default  rates. So the benefits  of such a manipulation  would 
have been unusually  large. 
Would  the costs to the broker  of such a manipulation  have been low 
enough  to make  it worth  attempting?  Certainly  the costs of the manipu- 
lation would have been low indeed-zero  in fact-if  the refinanced  is- 
sues were not financed  by the broker  himself, but instead were pur- 
chased by S&Ls that were engaged  in looting. The high  nominal  yields 
of the refinancings  would enhance the profit statements  of the S&Ls. 
Additionally  the owners  and  porfolio  managers  could  benefit  from  favor- 
able terms in the purchase  of stock options or shares of Milken's part- 
nerships. 
In addition  to being  able  to use other  people's money, three  additional 
factors amplified  the effectiveness of any portfolio purchases by the 
S&Ls in reducing  the overall default rate. As already discussed, the 
high-yield  securitized  debt market  was new and growing  very rapidly 
(much  faster  than  the rate  of interest  during  the 1980s),  so the volume  of 
old issues whose default losses needed to be manipulated  was quite 
small  relative  to the volume  of newly issued bonds. Second, S&L assets 
did not need to be used directly to purchase  refinancings.  It was suffi- 
cient for sophisticated  investors to understand  that the assets of the 
S&Ls could later be used as a guarantee  against  future  losses. In the 
meantime, these investors could fearlessly pocket the high coupons 
paid. Third, because the refinancings  sold without difficulty  and their 
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ferred  asset quality  from price) would take a significant  fraction  of the 
issues. As in the earlier  example  of Dallas  real  estate, copycat investors 
would  multiply  the impact  of S&L looting. 
In sum, the  junk  bond  market  of the 1980s  provided  a unique  opportu- 
nity for market  manipulation.  Were these opportunities  taken? In the 
following  discussion, we will show that the behavior  of the junk bond 
market  is in fact consistent  with market  manipulation. 
The Evidence: Actual Default  Rates 
We present  two kinds of evidence to support  the possibility  that the 
kind  of manipulation  described  earlier  took place  during  the 1980s.  First, 
we show that  even though  Drexel was believed to have very low default 
rates, below those of other issuers,73  in fact the true default  rate on its 
debt was higher  than  that  for other  junk underwriters.  In particular,  the 
default  rate on  junk issued to refinance  outstanding  debt was especially 
high, as was its debt issued for "general  corporate  purposes."  The next 
section  will also review evidence that  Milken  and  his associates engaged 
in patterns  of trading  with thrifts consistent with the scheme outlined 
above. 
Paul  Asquith, David W. Mullins,  and Eric D. Wolff have shown the 
importance  of exchanges in reducing  recorded default rates.74  Of the 
$14.6  billion  ofjunk bonds  issued between 1977  and 1983,  $2.2 billion  or 
about 15 percent had already  been exchanged by the end of 1988.75  If 
these exchanges involved troubled companies that would otherwise 
have defaulted,  the omission of these exchanges  from cumulative  mea- 
sured defaults could have substantially  altered the observed default 
rate. There is evidence that these issues did indeed involve unusually 
troubled  companies  because  refinancings  in their  short  average  life up to 
the end of 1986  had a remarkably  high rate of default-39  percent (by 
quantity)  and 33 percent (by value).76  Because the study by Asquith, 
Mullins,  and  Wolff, which  is our source  for these numbers,  was the first 
73. See George  Gilder,  "The  War  Against  Wealth,"  Wall  Street  Journal,  September 
27, 1990,  p. A12. 
74. Asquith,  Mullins,  and  Wolff  (1989). 
75. Authors'  calculations  from  Asquith,  Mullins,  and  Wolff  (1989,  table 1, p. 928, and 
table  6, p. 934). 
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to calculate default rates inclusive of these exchanges, there is every 
reason  to believe that  they were not taken  into account  in the  junk bond 
market's  halcyon  years. Moreover,  because  this study  measured  default 
rates only up to the end of 1988, before the collapse of the junk bond 
market  in 1989  and 1990,  the measured  default  rate as of this point can 
only underestimate  the ultimate  default  rate. 
It should  be emphasized  that exchanges  represented  only one way in 
which defaults  could be swept under  the carpet. The proceeds from is- 
sues for general  corporate  purposes  or perhaps  even for mergers  and  ac- 
quisitions  could also be used to finance current  debt service, thereby 
preventing  default  on prior  issues. 
A more recent analysis by the Bond Investor's Association, which 
makes  use of a comprehensive  tabulation  of all  junk debt, demonstrates 
an especially high  default  rate on Drexel-issued  refinancings  and classi- 
fies them according  to the stated purpose  of the debt issue.77  As of the 
end of 1992,  the default  rate on Drexel bonds issued between 1983  and 
1990  to refinance  existing bonds was 45.2 percent, compared  with 26.0 
percent for all other issuers.78  As the study's author  observes, "These 
figures lend support to critics who have contended that Drexel con- 
cealed the poor quality  of many  of its issues by refinancings."79 
The chronology  of events is also consistent  with  the hypothesis  of ma- 
nipulation.  The collapse of the  junk bond market  quickly  followed Mil- 
ken's indictment  in March 1989.  Between the end of 1988  and October 
1989,  the spread  between the  junk bond yield and the yield on ten-year 
Treasuries  rose from  488  basis  points  to 704. In 1990,  the spread  rose fur- 
ther, to above 1000.80  (It has subsequently  declined.) These changes in 
spread  are thus much more than the 2 to 3 percent change  in yield that 
might  be thought  sufficient  to make possible a large takeover wave. 
Furthermore,  over this same  period  junk bond  defaults  rose dramati- 
cally, by one account from $5 billion in 1988  to $22 billion in 1990. In 
the first  quarter  of 1991,  they totaled  $8.2 billion,  compared  to only $1.3 
billion  for the same  period  in 1988.81 
77. See Lehmann  (1993). 
78. Default  rates  are  here  calculated  by averaging  over issues. There  were  eighty-four 
refinancings  by Drexel  and  one hundred  by other  underwriters. 
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Links to Thrifts 
Although, as mentioned earlier, S&Ls held only $13.2 billion of junk 
bonds, these holdings were remarkable for their concentration: 69 per- 
cent were held by just eleven  institutions,  all of which had close  ties to 
Milken. The complaint by the FDIC against Milken on behalf of the Res- 
olution Trust Corporation (RTC) for improprieties in thejunk bond mar- 
ket (which was settled for $1.3 billion)82  makes the general claim that he 
led a group of "conspirators" (the so-called  Milken Group) who  used 
S&L assets to raise artificially the price ofjunk bonds. 
Beginning  at least  in 1982,  the Milken  Group  and  those acting  in concert  and  con- 
spiracy  with it have willfully,  deliberately  and systematically  plundered  certain 
S&Ls. The Milken  Group  targeted  the S&Ls because their deposits provided 
the S&Ls  with  an enormous  pool of capital.  Ready,  repeated,  easy access to that 
pool of capital  was a necessary  part  of the Milken  Group's  scheme  to unlawfully 
inflate  the value of junk bonds  and  to create  the illusion  that such inflated  value 
could  be realized  in a liquid  market.83 
Again, lest there be any doubt about its claims, the complaint later reem- 
phasizes them: 
Because of the purchases  by the Partnership  Class [mainly  partnerships  owned 
or controlled  by the Milken  Group]  and the other insider  accounts, the Milken 
Group  was able to create  a false appearance  of heavy demand  for Drexel-under- 
written  issues. This  deception  furthered  the scheme  by giving  apparent  credence 
to the proclamations  about the value of junk bonds, and the artificial  demand 
caused the market  price for such bonds to increase, enabling  the Partnership 
Class and other insider  accounts  to reap substantial  profits  and thus to reward 
various  participants  in their  schemes.84 
According  to the complaint,  many S&L  executives  variously  mis- 
managed their junk bond purchases. Three of these-Thomas  Spiegel of 
Columbia, Charles Keating of Lincoln,  and David Paul of CenTrust- 
were, along with unknown others, named as co-defendants.  According 
to James B.  Stewart,  Columbia S&L was one of the "captive" institu- 
tions that allowed Milken to "freely trade" in their accounts.85 Columbia 
Anita  Raghaven,  "Junk  Bond  Prices  Hold Steady  Despite  Report  That  Defaults  Hit a Re- 
cord in the Latest Period,"  Wall  Street Journal, April 9, 1991, p. 50, quoted in Black 
(1993b). 
82. See Stewart  (1992,  p. 523)  and  Seidman  (1993,  p. 238). 
83.  FDIC v. Milken (1991, p. 38). 
84.  FDIC v. Milken (1991, pp. 44-45). 
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was the largest holder of junk bonds by a factor of two, with more than 
a quarter of all S&L-held junk.  Benjamin J. Stein has described  how 
Spiegel was partially rewarded for such cooperation.86 Stein reports a 
transaction between Milken and Spiegel involving Columbia's purchase 
of the shaky bonds and preferred stocks involved in the Storer Commu- 
nications leveraged  buyout described  above.  A partnership owned  by 
Spiegel family members was reportedly given stock options for equity in 
Storer for $132,000, with the options  sold about a year after the lever- 
aged buyout for $7 million.87 
The  complaint  claims  that  such  behavior  was  part  of  a  general 
pattern: 
The Milken  Group  cultivated  a group  of persons  who controlled  S&Ls. Each of 
these persons  purchased  and  sold  junk  bonds  at the  bidding  of the Milken  Group. 
Each  of these persons  intended  to share  in the plunder  of their  respective  institu- 
tions and  to obtain  other  benefits  the Milken  Group  provided  to those who pur- 
chased large  quantities  of Drexel-underwritten  junk bonds. These persons, al- 
though  not necessarily  aware  of the scope of or participating  in the broad  range 
of illegal  activity  engaged  in by the Milken  Group,  agreed  to follow the bidding 
of the Milken  Group  for their  own benefit  and contrary  to the interests  of their 
respective institutions.  The persons, in addition  to others not now known, in- 
clude Charles  H. Keating,  Jr., who controlled  Lincoln, David Paul, who con- 
trolled  CenTrust,  and  Thomas  Spiegel,  who controlled  Columbia.88 
According  to other sources,  such use of other people's  money  was 
not confined to S&Ls.  According to Stewart and Stein, Fred Carr, the 
head of First Executive  Life Insurance,  also gave  control of his junk 
bond portfolio over to Milken. Carr let Milken's group trade the bonds 
in the First Executive  portfolio and send the tickets  for confirmation 
later.89  The details in this case are relatively well established  since the 
First Executive  Companies (the parent), which had presumed assets  of 
$15.2 billion, became massively insolvent and was taken over by author- 
ities in 1991. Roughly one-third of the assets  in the life insurance com- 
pany were invested  in junk bonds.  By comparison,  Metropolitan Life 
had 1 percent of its portfolio in junk, Aetna had 1 percent, and Pruden- 
tial, 3 percent.' 
86. Stein  (1992). 
87. Stein  (1992,  p. 105). 
88. FDIC  v. Milken  (1991,  p. 32). 
89. See Stewart  (1992,  p. 521)  and  Stein  (1992). 
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Milken  and Drexel took an active part, apparently,  in the transfer  of 
ownership  of many of the S&Ls that the complaint  describes as cap- 
tives. In some cases, the connection was indirect,  made through  close 
associates. According  to the complaint,  for example, Executive Life fi- 
nanced  the acquisition  of 24.9 percent  of the equity of Imperial  Savings 
and  Loan, while subsidiaries  of Columbia  took over 8.1 percent  of Impe- 
rial's  common  stock.9'  But the relationship  was often direct.  In the case 
of Columbia,  for example, Drexel acquired  10.3  percent, and a trust  for 
Milken's children  acquired  9.9 percent of the S&L's common stock- 
shares that were sold after Columbia  acquired  a significant  junk bond 
portfolio.92  Milken  also financed  the acquisition  of Lincoln  Savings  and 
Loan by Charles  Keating;  Ivan Boesky has testified  that  Milken  repeat- 
edly encouraged  him  to purchase  a thrift. 
Finally, there is circumstantial  evidence that members  of the Milken 
group  also tried  to manipulate  junk  bond  ratings.  According  to Stein, the 
bond  rating  company  Duff  & Phelps  was taken  over by a partnership  that 
had undisclosed ownership shares held by members of the Milken 
group,  including  James  Dahl, Milken's  top salesman  in the Beverly Hills 
office, as well as two of the "captive"  thrifts  named  in the complaint,  Im- 
perial  and  Columbia.  Duff  & Phelps  subsequently  gave favorable  ratings 
to bonds that  were issued by Columbia.93 
Calibrating the Magnitudes 
Institutions  with close links to Milken  and Drexel controlled  portfo- 
lios that held about $14 billion in junk bonds: about $9 billion at the 
thrifts  named  as captives in the complaint  and about $5 billion  at First 
Executive. Total defaults  on all original  issue high-yield  bonds with is- 
sue dates of 1986 or earlier totaled only $7.6 billion until the end of 
1988.94  If one-quarter  of the  junk holdings  of the so-called  "captive"  in- 
stitutions  were used to prevent defaults, this by itself would have re- 
duced  the observed  default  rate  by about  one-third.  If Milken  could  have 
persuaded  others  to purchase  some of the bonds  of troubled  companies, 
the reduction  in the observed  default  rate  would  have been greater.  One 
91.  FDIC v. Milken (1991, p. 62). 
92.  FDIC v. Milken (1991, p. 56). 
93.  Stein(1992,  pp. 147-48). 
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potential  source  of purchasers  was insiders  with  implicit  guarantees  that 
the captives would purchase the bonds before prices fell.  Outside 
investors, behaving  like the copycats in Dallas or index investors  in the 
stock market,  may also have bought some of these troubled  bonds be- 
cause apparently  sophisticated  investors were also buying  them. Thus 
junk bond  portfolios  of the S&Ls were of sufficient  size to have had sig- 
nificant  impact  on perceived  default  rates  in this market. 
One more simple calculation  suggests how profitable  the link with a 
savings  and  loan could  be. Drexel  underwrote  the acquisition  of Lincoln 
S&L  by Charles  Keating's  takeover  vehicle, American  Continental  Cor- 
poration  (ACC),  at a cost of $56 million. Over the next five years, Lin- 
coln purchased  $2.7 billion  of junk bonds.95  It is easy to verify, with the 
annual  pattern  ofjunk bond purchases  reported  in the FDIC complaint, 
that even if Drexel charged  at the lower end of its commissions  (3 per- 
cent) and  even if it had  a discount  rate  as high  as 15  percent,  the commis- 
sion income alone would have more than paid for the entire purchase 
price of the thrift-even  if Drexel had given the entire $56 million to 
Keating. 
The Role  of Manipulation  in the Takeover Wave 
Whatever  the evidence for manipulation  of the junk bond market  of 
the 1980s, such manipulation  cannot be the whole explanation  for the 
takeover  wave of the 1980s.  The gain to shareholders  of acquired  firms 
between 1977  and 1986  was $346 billion  in 1986  dollars.96  Because this 
increase  is much  larger  than  the total volume of junk bonds, no amount 
of manipulation  could have transferred  such a sum  from  holders  ofjunk 
bonds to shareholders.  Thus the manipulation  of default rates can, at 
best, be only a partial  explanation  for the 1980s  takeover wave. Evi- 
dence of other transfers  (which  shows that they also tended  to be small 
relative to total shareholder  gains), has been given by Jeffrey Pontiff, 
Andrei  Shleifer, and Michael  S. Weisbach  on losses to previous bond- 
holders, Sanjai  Bhagat,  Andrei  Shleifer,  and Robert  W. Vishny on tax 
benefits and layoffs, and Alan J. Auerbach  and David Reishus on tax 
benefits.97  Thus stocks must have been undervalued  relative to funda- 
95.  FDIC v. Milken (1991, p. 64). 
96. Jensen  (1988,  p. 21). 
97. Pontiff,  Shleifer,  and Weisbach  (1990);  Bhagat,  Shleifer,  and Vishny  (1990);  and 
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mentals  prior  to the 1980s,  or overvalued  thereafter.  A full explanation 
of the takeover  wave, irrespective  of the role of manipulation  of the  junk 
bond market, must explain this departure  from fundamental  values, 
which  made  the takeovers  so profitable. 
Conclusion 
This paper  has shown how other people's money, typically  deposits 
in  financial  institutions  or insurance  funds, can  profitably  be looted, with 
the guarantor  of the assets, typically  the government  and its taxpayers, 
left holding the bag. These opportunities  for looting occur when the 
value of the take net of the cost of prosecution, M*, exceeds the ex- 
pected value of the underlying  institution, V*. Under such circum- 
stances, there is special reason  for owners of the financial  institution  to 
make shady deals with those who make  large  (perhaps  under-the-table) 
current  payments and unkeepable  future promises. The large current 
payments  will increase  M*. The unkeepable  promises  will decrease the 
value of the institution  below V*. 
Furthermore,  initial  disturbances  caused  by looting  in one market  are 
likely to metastasize  with serious multiplier  effects into other markets. 
Thus the looting of S&Ls may result irn  a construction,  or a corporate 
leveraged  buyout, boom and bust. Large multiplier  effects are caused 
by buyers (or sellers) who watch standard  signals  of market  activity to 
determine  their behavior,  but who fail to understand  that the usual be- 
havior  of their  signals  has been altered  by unsuspected  looting.  The mul- 
tiplier  effects are likely to be particularly  large  if the actions of the loot- 
ers can be coordinated  in a way that is designed to manipulate  market 
signals. 
We examined  four  historical  events in light  of our  model:  the Chilean 
financial  crisis, U.S. S&L regulatory  changes, the Dallas/Fort  Worth 
building  boom and bust, and the junk bond-financed  takeover wave. 
These illustrations  show not only how the looters themselves behave, 
but also how they interact  symbiotically  with their  accomplices  and re- 
act to the attempts  by the regulators  to stop their  activities. The histori- 
cal instances  also show, as the theory  would  predict,  that  the exact out- 
come  in this  game  of cat (the  regulators)  and  mouse (the  looters)  depends 
very specifically  on the constraints  faced  by the cat and, sometimes,  also 
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The theory of looting gives an historical  interpretation  of what went 
wrong in the 1980s, and points to other areas that could emerge in the 
future. Insurance  companies, especially life insurance  companies, are 
prime targets for looting. The bankruptcy of  First Executive Life 
showed  how a life insurance  company  could  be looted through  excessive 
purchase  of junk bonds. The case of Coastal States Life Insurance  of 
Georgia,  seized in December 1992,  shows the difficulty  regulators  have 
in controlling  portfolios with complicated securities that they do not 
know how to value.98  Coastal  put almost  all of its portfolio  into interest- 
only strips of collateralized  mortgage  obligations  and inverse floaters. 
After the market  value on this supposedly  hedged portfolio  plunged, it 
took two years to close Coastal  because the owner  claimed  to have bro- 
ken no rules. However large  the losses to policy holders or the people 
who will be taxed to make up the losses, Coastal  States' owner did not 
do badly. His life insurance  company gave the marketing  affiliate  he 
owned $15.5 million  of contracts  during  the few short years of its life. 
Given  the relatively  loose structure  of insurance  supervision,  what  hap- 
pened at Coastal  can happen  at many  other  insurance  firms. 
The possibilities  to loot pension  funds  are analogous  to the possibili- 
ties to loot life insurance  companies.  Furthermore,  where  there  are  pen- 
sion guarantees,  the taxpayers  are the ultimate  bearers  of the burden  of 
underfunded  pensions when the sponsor firms  go bankrupt.  TWA is a 
case in point. Although  its pension fund was one of the country's most 
underfunded,  it offered its workers benefit increases of $100 million 
while it was in bankruptcy.99  To avoid such moral hazard, bills have 
been introduced  (but  not passed)  in Congress  to prevent  the most under- 
funded  pension plans  from  increasing  pension benefits.  '00 One estimate 
of the uncovered  liabilities  of the federal  government's  Pension  Benefit 
Guaranty  Corporation  is $35  billion.  101 
The currently  unfolding  scandal  on mortgage  guarantees  backed by 
the U.S. Department  of Housing  and Urban  Development  (HUD) gives 
a sense of dej'a  vu because the major  features of the S&L scandal are 
repeated  in a new context. The  government,  for  example,  is now respon- 
98. See Laura  Jereski,  "Seized  Insurer's  Woes Reflect  Perils  of CMOs,"  Wall  Street 
Journal,  May 12, 1993,  p. C1. 
99. See U.S. Congressional  Budget  Office  (1993,  p. 12). 
100. U.S. Congressional  Budget  Office  (1993,  p. 29). 
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sible for the $9.5 million  mortgage  on a property  in Boston, where "un- 
necessary  costs" were incurred.  The board  in charge,  it was concluded, 
had "not  always  act[ed]  in the best interests  of the project."  102 Some $43 
billion  of such mortgage  guarantees  have been issued, with defaults  ex- 
pected on $11.9 billion. 103 
Finally,  banking  crises are endemic  to high-inflation  countries.  In the 
1980s,  bank  stringency  occurred  in Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela, as well as other 
countries.  104 This paper  has shown  how attempts  to curb  the inflation  of 
Latin  America  can lead to the looting  of banks  if currency  convertibility 
is one aspect of the disinflation  program.  Such currency  convertibility 
is now standard  advice to countries  fighting  inflation.  105 The theory and 
examples  of this paper  warn  that  the maintenance  of such convertibility 
must be accompanied  by careful  bank regulation  to prevent looting of 
the kind  that  occurred  in Chile. More  generally,  it is a safe bet that  many 
developing  countries  that  have far  less sophisticated  and  honest regula- 
tory mechanisms  than those that exist in the United States will be vic- 
timized  by financial  market  fraud  as their  financial  markets  develop. 
The S&L  fiasco in the United States  leaves us with  the question,  why 
did  the government  leave itself so exposed to abuse?  Part  of the answer, 
of course, is that actions taken by the government  are the result of the 
political process. When regulators  hid the extent of the true problem 
with artificial  accounting  devices, when congressmen  pressured  regula- 
tors to go easy on favored constituents  and political donors, when the 
largest  brokerage  firms  lobbied  to protect  their  ability  to funnel  brokered 
deposits to any thrift  in the country, when the lobbyists for the savings 
and  loan industry  adopted  the strategy  of postponing  action  until  indus- 
try difficulties  were so large  that general  tax revenue would have to be 
used to address  problems  instead  of revenue raised  from taxes on suc- 
cessful firms  in the industry-when these and many other  actions were 
taken, people responded  rationally  to the incentives they faced within 
the political  process. 
102. See Jason  DeParle,  "Housing  Project  Haunted  by Ghosts  of Noble Ideals,"  New 
York  Times,  September  18, 1993,  p. A8. 
103. Price  Waterhouse  and Company  estimate  cited in the Wall  Street  Journal,  June 
21, 1993,  p. A12. 
104. See Brock  (1992,  p. 1). 
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The S&L crisis, however, was also caused by misunderstanding. 
Neither the public nor economists foresaw that the regulations  of the 
1980s were bound to produce looting. Nor, unaware  of the concept, 
could they have known how serious it would be. Thus the regulators  in 
the field  who understood  what was happening  from  the beginning  found 
lukewarm  support,  at best, for their  cause. Now we know better. If we 
learn  from  experience,  history  need not repeat  itself. Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert  E. Hall: George  Akerlof  and  Paul  Romer  challenge  the universal 
earlier  view that  the harm  from  deposit  insurance  and  other  loan  guaran- 
tees comes from  its truncation  of the lower  tail  of the distribution  of pay- 
offs. Under  that  view, guarantees  would  be harmless  in a nonstochastic 
world.  The alternative,  put  forward  with vigor  and  success in this paper, 
is that  asymmetric  payoffs-"fourth-quarter  football"-have little to do 
with the actual  costs of episodes like the S&L debacle. Rather,  guaran- 
tees create opportunities  for profits from looting that exist indepen- 
dently of any random  outcomes. Although  the paper  mentions  looting 
strategies  that may be legal, most of the actual conduct it describes is 
illegal  and most of the players  have been prosecuted.  Policy appears  to 
have been more successful in closing the legal loopholes than in pre- 
venting  illegal  behavior  before  it became  extremely  costly. 
As of the early 1980s,  the legal strategy  for exploiting  deposit insur- 
ance was to make high-interest  loans, buy junk bonds, or purchase  an 
S&L under terms with significant  accounting  goodwill, and then pay 
bloated salaries  and dividends  from the false accounting  income these 
investments  generated.  This approach  would  have yielded  a few million 
dollars  per S&L; anything  larger  would have attracted  the attention  of 
regulators,  who understood  the temptation  to pay excess dividends  and 
salaries. 
In addition  to exaggerated  dividends  and  salaries,  the paper  describes 
three other  methods  of value extraction  that appear  to transcend  legal- 
ity: concessionary  loans to owners;  loans to straws, who then share  the 
proceeds  with  the owners;  and  asset purchases  or exchanges  at exagger- 
ated  prices  involving  owners. 
Although  the incentive  to loot comes from  the ability  to extract  value 
from an S&L, the paper devotes much more attention  to the income- 
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exaggerating  strategies  of the big players in the 1980s  and surprisingly 
little to the value-extraction  part of the story. For Chile, there is only 
one paragraph  explaining  that the owners of government-guaranteed 
banks did not capture  any significant  looting proceeds themselves, but 
that lending to affiliates at preferential  rates did extract some value. 
Since such lending  reduced  the book earnings  that drove looting in the 
first  place, the story seems incomplete.  The focus on income exaggera- 
tion rather  than value extraction  in the discussion of U.S. S&Ls is just 
as strong.  The authors  write, "To  establish  a case for looting, it is neces- 
sary to show that loans were made, or assets purchased, in circum- 
stances in which no reasonable  person could expect a future positive 
payoff in any future  state of the world, but for which the present  payoff 
was very high."  No mention  is made  here  of value  extraction.  The color- 
ful account of the history of Empire  Savings  and Loan says not a word 
about  whether  the owners  received  anything  for  their  efforts.  The reader 
is invited  to infer  that  nobody  would  have done the crazy  things  that  hap- 
pened at S&Ls unless they planned  to take a lot of money out, but the 
paper  gives no evidence to support  that  inference.  We could  just as well 
conclude that S&L managers  got caught  up in a frenzy of bad lending 
and  bad deals from  which they gained  little. We do not even know if the 
developers who collaborated  in the process by pursuing  bad projects 
gained  much. We do know that  the debacle  had  huge social costs. 
The paper builds a case that looting, rather  than incompetence or 
fourth-quarter  football, accounted  for a large  fraction  of deposit insur- 
ance payouts. One  piece of evidence is that  the payouts  for S&Ls where 
the government  has prosecuted  looters have totaled about $54 billion. 
The  paper  does not give any  figure  on a comparable  basis  for  total  resolu- 
tion costs, so we do not have a good way to determine  whether  $54 bil- 
lion is a large  fraction  or not. 
A second piece of evidence that Akerlof  and Romer  offer for the im- 
portance  of looting  is the favorable  performance  of savings  banks, sub- 
ject to tight  regulation  as banks, in comparison  to the loosely regulated 
S&Ls. Total  resolution  costs for the savings  banks  have been only about 
$7 billion. Had the S&Ls had the same resolution cost per dollar of 
assets, total resolution  costs for the industry  would have been only $28 
billion. Again, no comparable  actual  figure  is available  for comparison, 
but  the actual  total  is many  times higher.  But  this evidence is completely 
consistent  with, say, the hypothesis  of managerial  incompetence.  By al- George  A. Akerlof  and Paul M. Romer  63 
most any theory  of S&L  misbehavior,  looting  or otherwise,  tighter  regu- 
lation would reduce resolution  costs. A reasonable  view of the differ- 
ence between S&Ls and savings banks is that it reflects  all the dangers 
of handing  one's Visa card  to a stranger  and not monitoring  its use very 
carefully-the  approach  the FSLIC took to deposit insurance.  Looting 
is one of the dangers,  but carelessness  is another. 
The third  piece of evidence is the lower incidence  of failure  at mutual 
thrifts  in comparison  to stock thrifts. The ratio is a little over three to 
one. I think  this evidence points more clearly to looting;  both types of 
institutions  are the responsibility  of the same regulators.  But it is a little 
troubling  that more than 8 percent  of mutuals  failed, even though  their 
structure  effectively bars  most forms  of looting. 
The paper  argues  that the social costs of looting  are greater  than  just 
the federal  bailout  costs; there  are  multiplier  effects from  the guaranteed 
institutions  to the broader  economy. The first example of a multiplier 
effect arises in their  model of the Dallas real estate market.  The formal 
model is a cousin of Robert Lucas's famous monetary nonneutrality 
model.  ' But Akerlof  and  Romer  get a bigger  effect because the intrusion 
of looters in their  model is an unprecedented  event, whereas  in Lucas's 
model, rational  actors are aware that unusual  things may happen and 
wisely limit their response to conditions that may be created by those 
events. 
Lucas's model  loses its multiplier  property  if anybody  reads  the Wall 
Street  Journal,  and, similarly,  Akerlof  and Romer's  model falls apart  if 
lenders and developers  read the National  Real Estate  Investor News. 
The model rests on incredible  naivete among  the honest players in the 
market.  I do not think  there  is any question  that  real  estate development 
overshot in Dallas in the 1980s. Part  of the overshooting,  of course, is 
explained  by the direct effects of S&L lending  generosity. Whether  a 
multiplier  model is needed to understand  the rest is an interesting  ques- 
tion not fully answered  by this paper. 
The second  multiplier  model  deals  with  manipulation  of thejunk  bond 
market.  The discussion here raises the possibility  that looters at S&Ls 
helped  defer  default  and  reduce  observed  default  rates.  In this way, they 
contributed  to what appears  to have been a massive overvaluation  of 
junk  bonds. Although  colorful,  the discussion  left me feeling  that  the ar- 
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gument  was a stretch. There is no discussion of any social costs of the 
overvaluation,  another  subtle issue that would have to be developed as 
part  of a convincing  argument  that there were large adverse multiplier 
effects on social welfare  from  looting. 
In spite  of my misgivings  about  the persuasive  power  of the evidence, 
especially  about  multiplier  effects, I think  the paper  does a great  service 
by identifying  clearly  what  is probably  the leading  danger  of the growing 
tendency  of the federal  government  to open its checkbook  to outsiders. 
The danger is absolutely direct; people will figure out ways to write 
themselves large checks, and they will risk  jail if the checks are large 
enough. Economists' views about the hazards  of loan guarantees  have 
not been realistic  about  human  nature. 
The paper mentions briefly some of the other loan guarantee  pro- 
grams  where looting  is prevalent.  In fact, the brief  account of events at 
Coastal  States Life Insurance  is one of the cleanest  examples  of looting. 
Federal  guarantees  of pension  benefits  offer another  example  of looting 
within  the paradigm  of the paper.  The Clinton  administration  has talked 
about  a new type of pension  fund  guarantee  for "social"  investments  that 
appears particularly  ripe for looting. Although federal guarantees of 
single-family  mortgages  seems to have escaped looting  so far, it appears 
that other mortgage  guarantee  programs  are being looted. Federal stu- 
dent loan programs  have been looted extensively, though not by the 
methods described  in the paper. In all instances, tight, vigilant  regula- 
tion can block looting, but regulators  do not always perform  to that 
standard. 
Richard  Posner has made the profound  argument  that any govern- 
ment  benefit  program  induces  social rent-seeking  losses equal  to the pri- 
vate benefits  conferred.  The whole idea  of benefits  is fundamentally  per- 
verse, in that view. Akerlof and Romer go even further  to show that 
social losses are many  times the private  benefits  when the benefits  must 
be earned  by looting. 
N. Gregory Mankiw: According  to a view now popular  in the media, 
the 1980s were a decade of unusual, unmitigated  greed. The ultimate 
symbol  of this greed  was the savings  and  loan crisis. The root cause, ac- 
cording  to the conventional  wisdom, was the laissez-faire  policies of the 
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Although  the two authors  from  Berkeley did not intend  this paper  to 
be a defense  of Ronald  Reagan  and  his view of government,  one can eas- 
ily interpret  it this way. The paper  shows that  the savings  and  loan crisis 
was the result  not of unregulated  markets,  but  of overregulated  ones (or, 
at least, poorly  regulated  ones). After  reading  the paper,  one is left with 
the impression  that  the policy mistakes  that  happened  here are  probably 
not isolated,  and  that  the only good solution  is to get the government  out 
of this kind  of business altogether. 
The policy that  led to the savings  and  loan crisis is, according  to these 
authors,  deposit  insurance.  This conclusion  is not new, of course. What 
is new here is the discussion of the mechanism  through  which deposit 
insurance  caused the problem.  The standard  story is that deposit insur- 
ance, together with low levels of capitalization,  induced savings and 
loans to take excessive risks. This behavior  is sometimes  called "gam- 
bling for resurrection."  By contrast, George Akerlof and Paul Romer 
suggest  a more  direct  mechanism  for how a savings  and  loan might  take 
advantage  of deposit  insurance.  The  owners  can simply  take  in deposits, 
pay themselves  dividends  greater  than  the net worth  of the business, and 
then leave the government  to pay off the resulting  debts. Akerlof and 
Romer  call this behavior  "looting." 
The paper  offers many  fascinating  anecdotes suggesting  that looting 
was part  of the story behind  the perverse  business practices  of the sav- 
ings and loans. Indeed, given the incentives that regulators  set up, it 
would  be irrational  for operators  of the savings and loans not to loot. A 
key question  is whether  looting  or  gambling  for resurrection  was the root 
cause of the savings  and  loan problem.  Here the paper  falls a bit short. I 
am not yet persuaded  that  looting  was the primary  motive. 
One  problem  in interpreting  the many  shreds  of evidence in the paper 
is that looting and gambling  for resurrection  are not really alternative 
strategies.  Indeed, they are highly  complementary.  Consider  an owner 
of a savings  and  loan who is taking  excessive risks, hoping  that  they pay 
off and make him rich. It is only prudent  for him to loot as much as he 
can, because he knows that  his gambles  might  not pay off. 
If looting  is the primary  motive, rather  than  just a rational  subsidiary 
strategy,  running  a savings and loan must have been profitable  even if 
default  occurs. That is, the owners of failed savings and loans should 
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this is true. Undoubtedly,  it is hard  to tell, in part because successful 
looters are loathe  to advertise  their  good fortune. 
According  to Akerlof  and Romer, looting rather  than  gambling  must 
have been the primary  motive, because many  of the loans made  were so 
bad there was no reasonable  hope of them paying  off. Again, I am not 
persuaded.  First, it is not surprising  that the operators  of savings and 
loans  were  bad  businessmen.  Gambling  for  resurrection  is not a business 
strategy  that  is likely to attract  the best and  the brightest  of the financial 
community. 
Second, in the presence of adverse shocks, it is hard  to tell an exces- 
sively risky gamble  from a completely hopeless one. Consider,  for ex- 
ample,  what  would  have happened  if the price  of oil had  doubled  in 1986, 
rather  than halving as it did. Clearly, the history of Texas real estate 
would have looked very different.  Most likely, the owners of the Texas 
savings  and  loans would  today be treated  as prescient  heros rather  than 
despicable  scoundrels.  The media  would  praise  them  for their  far-sight- 
edness, and they would now be in the pantheon  of financial  greats with 
Warren  Buffet and George Soros. In reality, the collapse in world oil 
prices  was part  of the story  behind  the Texas savings  and  loans. It is hard 
to know  for sure  what  would  have happened  if the shocks had  been more 
favorable. 
Let me now turn to what this episode implies for public policy. A 
common  reaction  to the savings  and  loan crisis is that  it shows the need 
for higher  capital  requirements,  better  accounting  rules, and more vigi- 
lant  regulators.  In  contrast,  I view the message  as being  more  basic. This 
episode calls into question  the desirability  of government  insurance  for 
bank  deposits, as well as the entire  banking  system on which our econ- 
omy relies. 
Traditional  banks are peculiar institutions. Traditional  banks have 
depositors who want short-term,  liquid, riskless assets. Yet these de- 
posits are backed  by long-term,  illiquid,  risky  loans. This incongruity  is 
fundamental.  As we have seen, it cannot  be easily fixed  by a government 
policy such as deposit insurance. 
There is, however, a simple, market-based  solution: mutual  funds. 
Individuals  who want truly riskless assets can invest in mutual  funds 
that  hold  only Treasury  bills. Those who are  willing  to undertake  greater 
risk  can invest in mutual  funds  that  hold privately  issued CDs, bonds, or 
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which would  raise  funds  by issuing  equity and bonds. In the world  I am 
describing,  all household assets would be perfectly liquid. Preventing 
bank  runs-the  original  motivation  for deposit  insurance-would be un- 
necessary, because changes in demand  for various  assets would be re- 
flected  in market  prices. 
In essence, the system we have now is one in which finance  compa- 
nies are themselves financed  with demand  deposits. Yet these finance 
companies  hold assets-long-term bank  loans-that  are risky and illiq- 
uid, much  in the same way that  fixed capital  is risky  and  liquid.  Imagine 
that the auto industry  financed  itself with demand  deposits. Undoubt- 
edly, self-fulfilling  "runs"  on GM and Ford would be common, and the 
auto  industry  would  be highly  unstable.  Indeed,  the auto  industry  would 
probably  be a major  source  of macroeconomic  instability.  The best solu- 
tion, of course, would not be deposit insurance  and regulation  of the 
auto industry,  but a change  in the way the industry  financed  itself. 
There  is also a more  general  lesson to be learned  from  the savings  and 
loan crisis. When  I was a student  in the 1970s,  I was taught  that deposit 
insurance  is an almost perfect government  policy. The policy assures 
depositors that their money is safe. At the same time, it establishes a 
good equilibrium  without bank runs and bank failures, so the policy 
costs the government  almost  nothing. 
So much for theory. The general  lesson from this experience is one 
that Ronald  Reagan  would embrace:  government  intervention  into pri- 
vate markets  is usually  more  expensive and  has more  perverse  incentive 
effects than  one can anticipate.  This lesson is a timely one, because the 
current  administration  looks like it may turn  out to be the most activist 
in twenty-five  years. 
General Discussion 
William  Black offered three specific reasons why people engaged  in 
illegal  looting  when they could have looted legally. First, the amount  of 
loot is limited  if one sticks to dividends  or salaries.  Second, looting  with 
excessive dividends  and salaries  was too obvious, and would have at- 
tracted  attention  from  regulators.  Finally,  there  were big  gains  to staying 
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institutions  to make  additional  illegal  loans to keep old ones from  going 
into default. 
James  Tobin  agreed  that  Greg  Mankiw'  s proposal  for a depository  in- 
stitution backed by treasuries would provide a safe medium of ex- 
change, while avoiding the potential problems of deposit insurance 
when banks hold a risky portfolio. He noted the similarity  to "core- 
banking"  proposals made in the past, and suggested that safe-asset 
banking could be done either by the government or within existing 
banks. Chris Sims observed that Mankiw's  proposed risk-free  mutual 
funds  either  do not represent  complete  deregulation  or are not risk-free; 
if there  were not publicly  enforced  restrictions  on the assets held by the 
funds, there would be a risk to depositors  that the funds would under- 
take risky investments. Romer pointed out that Mankiw's proposal 
deals only with bank deposit insurance  and provides no solution for 
other situations  where the government  gives guarantees,  including  in- 
surance,  pensions, and student  loans. 
Mankiw's  comments  that the S&L crisis is an example  of excessive 
government  regulation  generated  a lively discussion. Chris  Sims argued 
that Mankiw  turned  the matter  on its head because the defining  feature 
of the 1980s  was deregulation,  not regulation.  He added  that  it is simplis- 
tic to believe that shrinking  the government  will solve every problem; 
criminals  are always in favor  of shrinking  government-particularly  the 
part  that  polices them-and  will of course take advantage  of opportuni- 
ties to pass themselves off as part  of a crowd  interested  in efficiency. 
Black pursued the issue of what caused the regulatory  breakdown 
in the 1980s  and why it occurred  primarily  at the Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance  Corporation  (FSLIC). He suggested  that moral  hazard 
at the FSLIC played an important  role; it was already insolvent and 
therefore  the people in charge  had a strong  incentive to take excessive 
risks. More generally, the Reagan-Bush  administrations  maintained  a 
strong  antiregulatory  stance; it was official  administration  policy not to 
close insolvent institutions unless they had a severe liquidity crisis, 
which could be avoided for a long time with deposit insurance.  Black 
also pointed  to the legislation  that allowed thrifts  to diversify into new 
assets. Because the new class of assets did not have readily  ascertain- 
able market  values, they were well suited to engaging  in fraudulent  be- 
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In the same vein, Tobin recalled the reply that William  Seidman  of 
the FDIC  received  when he asked  the White  House for more  regulators: 
"Perhaps  you don't understand  what administration  you are working 
for." Tobin also pointed to the increased limit on insured  deposits to 
$100,000  as a cause of the regulatory  breakdown.  But Romer  suggested 
that  if the limit  had  been lower, people would simply  have split up their 
funds  among  different  institutions.  In contrast  to the conclusion  reached 
by Mankiw,  the lesson Tobin drew from the S&L debacle was that de- 
regulation  cannot be done piecemeal;  if the government  is going to de- 
regulate  the asset side of the balance sheet and ease up on regulatory 
oversight,  it has to give up on deposit insurance  at the same time. 
William  Nordhaus proposed additional  reasons why deposit insur- 
ance did not have harmful  effects until  the 1980s.  One possibility  is that 
looting  just was not accepted until  the 1980s;  fads, epidemics, and  fash- 
ions have important  sway in determining  moral  and  economic  behavior. 
Another  possibility is that "depressions  uncover what the accountants 
miss," and that looting-type  behavior  was widespread  but not discov- 
ered until the depression  in real estate. Nordhaus  concluded  by noting 
that  roughly  two generations  elapse  between  debt  crises, raising  the pos- 
sibility  that  the country  would be due for another  in about  sixty years. 
Barry Eichengreen  brought  up additional  examples where the au- 
thors' model could be applied.  In Germany,  people are forced to insure 
their  low-quality  Trabant  cars for more than they are worth. So people 
actually  invite their cars to be stolen-by  leaving their  doors unlocked 
and  the keys in the ignition,  for example. Looting,  also known  as "spon- 
taneous privatization,"  is encouraged in Russia by soft budget con- 
straints  that  prevent  the firms  in which the "looters"  are employed  from 
suffering  the consequences. In the nineteenth century, Eichengreen 
added,  government  guarantees  of railroad  bonds  led to sweetheart  deals 
between  promoters  of railroads  and  construction  companies  in Canada, 
India, Australia,  and Africa, which were probably  responsible  for the 
widespread  failures of railroad  enterprises. Fewer failures occured in 
the United States, where bond  guarantees  were less prevalent. 70  Br-ookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
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